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INTRODUCTION 
Every few decades, there erupt political and academic debates over 
the proper nature and purpose of the corporation.1 It is black letter 
law, according to most scholars, that corporations exist to maximize 
shareholder wealth. Others maintain that the corporation should exist 
for the benefit of multiple constituencies, regardless of what current 
black letter law may say. The current discourse of corporate purpose, 
however, is incomplete and misleading. The disarray has resulted from 
insufficient reliance on historical context in (1) analyzing the firm 
under modern theories of corporate governance, and (2) interpreting 
the “purpose” language in corporate charters and corporation-law 
statutes. 
Modern conceptions of corporate governance, and by extension, 
corporate purpose, have failed to account for the historical evolution 
of the firm. Significantly, they characterize the corporation along too 
few dimensions, typically treating the firm as merely, and exclusively, 
a contract- or property-based entity; and they neglect to treat the later-
stage corporation as a historical entity that inherits characteristics and 
restrictions, including its purpose, from the time of its founding. 
Corporations are a triality of property, contractual, and 
associational rights. Firms can simultaneously and independently be 
described along each dimension. The triality of rights should entitle 
shareholders to form general corporations to pursue the ends of their 
choosing—shareholder wealth maximization or otherwise. Focusing 
on one aspect of the firm at the expense of the other two, however, 
obscures the central place of shareholder ends in the corporation. 
At its inception, the corporation is nearly indistinguishable from 
its shareholders, who possess the special talents or resources around 
 
 1. E.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING 
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012); Stephen 
M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor 
Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1435 n.40 (1994) [hereinafter Bainbridge, SWM Norm]; 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971, 
971 (1992) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Constituency Statutes]; Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical 
and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 
583 n.17 (1992) (citing waves of sources engaging the topic about every 20 years). 
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which the enterprise is started. They possess all the property, financial, 
and control sticks in the corporate bundle of rights. They associate via 
the corporate form to better achieve some end than they could 
without it. Shareholders necessarily give up ever more control as the 
firm grows. But even at later stages in a firm’s life, shareholders retain 
enough rights to entitle them to have their corporations run in pursuit 
of the purposes they established at the firm’s founding (or later 
modified via the proper procedures). 
This Article distinguishes two understandings of the corporate 
“purpose” language that is a statutorily required component of every 
corporate charter. The first is what the Article terms the corporation’s 
“tactical,” or operating, purpose. A corporation engages in its 
operations as it pursues its “strategic” purpose. The strategic purpose 
is the telos of the corporation or its board of directors. Shareholder 
wealth maximization is the archetypical strategic purpose, and the one 
most naturally derived from the corporate bundle of rights. 
The Article addresses the assertion that corporate law does not, at 
least by default, require directors to maximize shareholder wealth, and 
concludes that this claim is indefensible when viewed in proper 
context. This fundamental stockholder right established, the Article 
proposes expanding existing law to allow stockholders to charter 
corporations for any lawful strategic purpose, given sufficient notice 
to potential mid-stream shareholders. It thus argues for a clarification 
of the marked uncertainty in corporate law as to whether nonwealth 
corporate ends are cognizable. Corporate law provides the pieces to 
maximize the social benefit enabled by the corporate form. This 
Article offers a flexible yet simple way to join those pieces together by 
permitting, but not requiring, stockholders to depart from the wealth 
maximization norm. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I situates the discussion 
of purpose amidst the three primary theories of corporate governance, 
lays out the Article’s working model of the corporate bundle of sticks, 
and sets forth its definition of corporate purpose. Part II interrogates 
the five primary arguments against the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm. Part III proposes that shareholders be allowed to 
depart from the norm by forming corporations to pursue their choice 
of strategic purposes. It also addresses accountability concerns raised 
by the proposal. 
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I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE PURPOSE 
This Part begins by reviewing the history and features of the three 
ascendant models of corporate governance. It draws on this discourse 
to make observations about the characteristics of corporations and 
shareholders, the relationships between the two, and the nature of 
corporate ends. It then discusses states’ reasons for chartering 
corporations. It thus lays out the analytical framework for the 
remainder of the Article. 
A. Corporate Governance Frameworks 
The major milestones in corporate theory over the last quarter 
millennium situate the three dominant models of corporate 
governance: shareholder primacy, director primacy, and the team-
production model. 
In his renowned 1776 treatise The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith 
presented the classical view of the corporation owned by its 
shareholders and managed on their behalf: 
The directors of [corporations], . . . being the managers rather of 
other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, 
that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with 
which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their 
own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention 
to small matters as not for their master’s honour, and very easily give 
themselves a dispensation from having it.2 
Professors Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means echoed this 
conception of the firm 157 years later in their famous The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property. They focused on the “separation of 
ownership and control” in diffusely held firms like public corporations 
in which traditional incidents of ownership were no longer vested in 
an individual or a small group with detailed knowledge of the firm’s 
business.3 The separation made shareholder-owners even more 
vulnerable to managerial self-dealing than they were in Adam Smith’s 
time. 
 
 2. 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 233 (Edwin Cannan ed., Methuen & Co. 1904) (1776); see id. at 232–48. 
 3. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 4–6, 70–72, 89–93 (1933). 
2.MOCSARY.FIN2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/16  12:31 PM 
1319 Freedom of Corporate Purpose 
 1323 
Economist Milton Friedman summarized the view that managers 
worked for stockholders in 1970: 
In a free enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive is 
an employee of the owners of the business. He has [a] direct 
responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct the 
business in accordance with their desires, which generally will be to 
make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules 
of the society . . . . Insofar as his actions in accord with his “social 
responsibility” reduce returns to stockholders, he is spending their 
money.4 
Although Professor Friedman is frequently quoted for his support of 
shareholder wealth maximization, his careful use of the word 
“generally” suggests that, although it may not be commonplace, he 
apparently believed that shareholder ends need not be monetary. 
Six years later, Professors Michael C. Jensen and William H. 
Meckling solidified the agency theory of the firm, under which 
managers work to generate profits for their shareholder principals.5 
They also popularized the nexus-of-contracts view, which 
characterizes corporations as “legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a 
set of contracting relationships among individuals.”6 Although agency 
theory strongly implies firm ownership by the principals, and Jensen 
and Meckling referred to shareholders as “owners,”7 their analysis also 
suggests that shareholders are merely providers of one of the inputs—
capital—needed to run the firm.8 
In 1991, Professors Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel 
wholeheartedly adopted the contractarian view of the firm in their 
influential The Economic Structure of Corporate Law.9 They abandoned 
 
 4. Milton Friedman & Craig P. Dunn, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase 
Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, § 6, at 32, 33 (emphasis added). 
 5. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308–09 (1976). 
 6. Id. at 310–11. Professors Jensen and Meckling found roots for their work in that of 
Arman Alchian and Harold Demsetz on corporations and property rights. Id. at 307 & n.5. 
Professors Alchian and Demsetz referred to the firm as a “centralized contractual agent in a team 
productive process.” Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777–78 (1972). 
 7. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 308–09, 317–19. 
 8. See id. at 311. 
 9. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 1–39, 91 (1991). 
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the notion that shareholders own the firm, but nevertheless continued 
to assert that managers were shareholders’ agents.10 
Shareholder Primacy and Director Primacy stem from, and Team 
Production responds to,11 these frameworks. Each contains both 
descriptive and normative elements. Director Primacy and Team 
Production proponents acknowledge that their frameworks are less 
descriptive in the context of a controlling shareholder.12 Some of the 
models’ features nevertheless depend on assumptions related to the 
firm’s founding. Those features are addressed in this and the 
next  section. 
1. Shareholder primacy 
Shareholder primacy is based primarily on the view that 
shareholders own the corporation. But, in some iterations, it takes on 
contractarian attributes. 
Classic shareholder primacy holds that corporate managers13 work 
for shareholder-owners.14 The shareholders, who risked their wealth 
to enable the enterprise, are entitled to have the firm run for their 
benefit and have a “residual” claim on anything left over after the 
firm’s contractual obligations have been fulfilled.15 Managers have 
incentive to shirk because they do not receive all of the marginal 
 
 10. Id. passim; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 
J.L. & ECON. 395, 396 (1983) (“Shareholders are no more the ‘owners’ of the firm than are 
bondholders, other creditors, and employees (including managers) who devote specialized 
resources to the enterprise . . . .”). 
 11. Professors Blair and Stout also found roots for their Team Production model in 
economists Armen Alchian’s and Harold Demsetz’s work on coordination in complex 
productive processes. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 265–68 (1999); see supra note 6. 
 12. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 596–97 (2003); Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 256, 281, 
309. 
 13. This Article’s references to managers includes directors unless stated otherwise. 
 14. E.g., BERLE & MEANS, supra note 3, passim; Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization and Its Implementation Under Corporate Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 389, 396–97 
(2014); see supra text accompanying notes 3–8; infra Section II.A.1. 
 15. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 3, passim; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 311–12; 
cf. Simons v. Cogan, 542 A.2d 785, 791 (Del. Ch. 1987) (contrasting the contractual rights of 
bondholders and fiduciary duties owed to shareholders to protect their interests); Harff v. 
Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 218–19 (Del. Ch. 1974) (stating that stock ownership is evidence of 
the ownership of corporate assets rather than a debt owed by the corporation). 
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benefits of their work, as a 100-percent owner-manager would.16 
Being self-interested, they will attempt to run firms to maximize their 
own well-being rather than that of their shareholder principals.17 This 
incentive misalignment causes the firm to be run inefficiently—in a 
way that creates less overall value—with the resulting loss of value 
termed “agency costs.”18 To minimize agency costs, managers are 
legally required to exert their best efforts to maximize shareholder 
wealth.19 With this corporate goal fixed, nonshareholder 
constituencies—managers, employees, customers, creditors, 
communities, and others—can contract ex ante for their fair share of 
the value created by the corporation.20 
In its contractarian iteration, shareholder primacy views the 
corporation as a contract-facilitation entity that serves as a natural 
nexus for production factors. In its most property-oriented form, 
shareholders still own the company, but they do business in the 
corporate form because it catalyzes the contracting with managers, 
employees, and others that is needed for production.21 Importantly, it 
allows contracts that would have to be negotiated individually across 
markets to be brought into the firm and directed in a command-and-
control fashion.22 At its other extreme, shareholder primacy eschews 
the notion of the corporation as a thing capable of being owned. 
Under this version, shareholders merely provide capital to the 
corporation in exchange for a residual claim on its assets.23 
 
 16. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 312–13. 
 17. Lucian Bebchuck, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 
850 (2005); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 308. 
 18. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 308–10. 
 19. Other ways to reduce agency costs include setting up performance monitoring and 
evaluation systems, compensation schemes, and internal rules to minimize managerial self-
dealing. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 308–09, 328. 
 20. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 
GEO. L. REV. 439, 441 (2001). 
 21. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. Professors Margaret M. Blair and Lynn 
A. Stout employ the catalysis portion of this contractarianism in their Team Production model. 
See supra note 11; infra Section I.A.3. 
 22. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, ECONOMICA, Nov. 1937, at 386, 390–98. 
The need for these contracts may be anticipated or unanticipated. 
 23. See Sharfman, supra note 14, at 397; Alexei M. Marcoux, For Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization, Against Corporate Purpose, LIBR. L. & LIBERTY (Dec. 5, 2013), 
http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/for-shareholder-wealth-maximization-against-
corporate-purpose; supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text. Professor Stephen M. Bainbridge 
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2. Director primacy 
Professor Stephen M. Bainbridge’s Director Primacy framework is 
purely contractarian, viewing firms as incapable of either being owned 
or having a defined purpose.24 Shareholders supply capital in an 
implicit exchange for the residual claim on the firm’s assets.25 Director 
primacy sees the board of directors, rather than the firm or its 
stockholders, as the sui generis nexus of contracts that hires production 
factors.26 The board is not an agent of the shareholders, but the 
supreme power in a web of contractual relationships that includes it.27 
The board is therefore most like the firm’s “owner.”28 
Director Primacy’s key objection to classical Shareholder 
Primacy’s view of shareholders as owners is that shareholders do not 
exhibit many of the usual characteristics of owners, most notably 
control over the corporation’s assets or activities.29 Professor 
Bainbridge is known for saying that “the board acts and the 
shareholders, at most, react” to the board’s actions.30 Strong central 
decision-making authority in the board is necessary, however, to run 
the corporation (or, at least public ones) effectively.31 Yet because the 
board can abuse its power to its members’ advantage, it is legally 
obliged via fiduciary duties to maximize the wealth of the shareholder 
residual claimants.32 
 
employs this form of contractarianism in his Director Primacy model. See supra note 12; infra 
Section I.A.2. 
 24. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The vacuity of corporate purpose, 
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (May 5, 2012), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professo
rbainbridgecom/2012/05/the-vacuity-of-corporate-purpose.html; see also WILLIAM A. KLEIN 
ET AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 117–22 (11th ed. 2010) (acknowledging that 
the law treats corporations as real entities, but arguing that this approach is improper as a matter 
of theory because firms are human instrumentalities). 
 25. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 563. 
 26. Id. at 550, 559–60. 
 27. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. 
L. REV. 83, 102 (2004). 
 28. Id. at 102–03. 
 29. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 563–74. 
 30. Id. at 559; see id. at 563, 570. 
 31. Bainbridge, supra note 27, at 86, 103; see supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 32. Bainbridge, supra note 27, at 103; Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 563–65. 
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3. Team production 
The Team Production model’s distinguishing characteristic is that 
it disavows the notion that board members are shareholders’ agents 
who have a duty to maximize shareholder wealth.33 Rather, the board’s 
role is to act as a group of “mediating hierarch[s]” that “protect[s] 
the enterprise-specific investments of . . . the corporate ‘team,’ 
including shareholders, managers, rank and file employees, and 
possibly other groups, such as creditors” and “the local community.”34 
Team members hire the board to protect them from each other’s 
opportunism and to coordinate their production activities.35 They thus 
opt into the hierarchy to mutually relinquish to the board of directors 
their rights over firm-specific inputs.36 This mutual hands-tying makes 
it safe for team members to make long-term investments which are 
difficult to protect via explicit contract, but are essential for the firm 
to operate efficiently and profitably.37 Free of responsibility to any one 
group, directors are able to serve the entire team.38 
The Team Production model is contractarian, but “not so much a 
‘nexus of contracts’ . . . as a ‘nexus of firm-specific investments.’”39 
Like Director Primacy, it holds that shareholders do not own firms.40 
Rather, “[c]orporations [or at least public ones] are independent legal 
entities that own themselves.”41 Contrary to Director Primacy, the 
Team Production model posits that, although the corporation exists, 
shareholders (and presumably the other team members) are 
“fictional,” at least from the standpoint of the corporate entity.42 
 
 33. Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 248–49. 
 34. Id. at 250, 253. 
 35. Id. at 280. 
 36. Id. at 274, 277. 
 37. Id. at 253, 275, 277, 285. 
 38. Id. at 288. Professors Blair and Stout find support for their view in the manager-
friendly nature of the business judgment rule. Id. at 298–309. 
 39. Id. at 275, 285. 
 40. STOUT, supra note 1, at 8. 
 41. Id. at 37; see supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 42. Id. at 59–60, 86–87, 89. 
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B. The Property-Contract-Association Triality43 
Despite their differing theoretical underpinnings, each framework 
described in the previous section possesses varying descriptive strength 
depending on the firm’s particulars and the situation in which it finds 
itself. This section begins by analyzing the shareholder’s interest in the 
corporate bundle of sticks as the firm proceeds from its founding. It 
continues with a description of its approach to “corporate purpose.” 
The section concludes with a note on the state’s purpose in chartering 
corporations. 
1. The corporate bundle of sticks 
This section portrays a typical founding of a firm and its growth 
into a public corporation.44 It traces the development of the corporate 
bundle of sticks,45 tying in each corporate-governance model’s 
characterization of the firm, to show that shareholders retain enough 
sticks to entitle them to corporate pursuit of their charter-specified 
ends. 
 a. The early stages. A new corporation enjoys a great deal of unity 
with its founder-owner. Once the charter46 is in hand, the founder may 
cause the new firm to issue all its shares to him or her, or to multiple 
individuals. The new share owner or owners may put cash or property 
into the firm, or provide it only with services. In the case of a single 
 
 43. This section is named after the Wave-Particle Duality of Light. After centuries of 
debate over whether light consisted of particles or waves, modern physics has confirmed that it 
can, independently and simultaneously, be characterized as both. E.g., Kenneth R. Spring & 
Michael W. Davidson, Light: Particle or a Wave?, MOLECULAR EXPRESSIONS, 
http://micro.magnet.fsu.edu/primer/lightandcolor/particleorwave.html (last visited Sept. 
8,  2016). 
 44. The real but stylized examples in this section are just a few of the near-infinite number 
of variations on a firm’s life cycle. Hybrids of the stages described herein of course exist. This 
will not, however, typically change the analysis. 
 45. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 6, at 783 (referring to the corporate “bundle 
of rights”). 
 46. Traditionally, the charter consisted of the articles of incorporation filed by the founder 
along with the certificate of incorporation issued by the state of incorporation. Delaware and the 
Model Business Corporation Act have eliminated this procedure, replacing it with one in which 
the articles are made official by a stamp indicating the time of filing. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 
103(c)(3) (Supp. 2014); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 1.25, 2.03 & cmts. 1–3. Delaware has 
further complicated matters by referring to the articles as the certificate. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
8, §§ 101–103 (2011 & Supp. 2014, 2015). 
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shareholder, the founder is likely to elect him- or herself the sole 
director. This “election” is likely to be a nonevent, with the owner 
simply proceeding to do business in the corporate name. If there are 
multiple original shareholders, the selection of directors may be more 
formal, but still consist of little more than a conversation or e-mail 
exchange among the founding team. The original group is almost 
certain to run the firm, hiring employees to do basic tasks as needed. 
The group’s members, who would be unlikely to entrust their financial 
futures to strangers, will be well acquainted. Professor Henry 
Mintzberg refers to this organizational form as the Simple Structure.47 
A Simple Structure nearly indistinguishable from its owners is the 
incorporated family farm.48 The family, which generally incorporates 
to receive limited-liability protection or realize tax benefits,49 
comprises the farm’s shareholders and runs the farm essentially as it 
would without the benefit of incorporation.50 Its entire life, including 
its home, is the farm. 
The law recognizes and embraces this unity. Subchapter S of 
Chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code provides perhaps the most 
ubiquitous example,51 allowing a corporation’s shareholders to select 
“S corporation” status for the firm to cause it to be taxed on a pass-
through basis.52 The tax code effectively treats an act of the s-corp as 
an act of the shareholders—every dollar that the firm pays for, say, 
health insurance,53 is one that is neither earned by nor attributed to 
the shareholders. Corporate law’s veil-piercing doctrines recognize 
 
 47. HENRY MINTZBERG, STRUCTURE IN FIVES: DESIGNING EFFECTIVE 
ORGANIZATIONS 159 (1993); see id. at 157–61 (describing the Simple Structure). 
 48. See Cargill, Inc. v. Hedge, 375 N.W.2d 477 (Minn. 1985) (finding identity between 
the incorporated farm and its sole shareholder for the purposes of a Minnesota’s 
homestead  exemption). 
 49. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 24, at 117–22. 
 50. See State Bank in Eden Valley v. Euerle Farms, Inc., 441 N.W.2d 121, 124 (Minn. 
App. 1989) (“[T]here was a strong degree of identity between the Euerles and Euerle Farms.”). 
 51. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1361–79 (2012 & Supp. 2014, 2015); Drew DeSilver, What is a ‘closely 
held corporation,’ anyway, and how many are there?, PEW RES. CTR. (July 7, 2014), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/07/07/what-is-a-closely-held-corporation-
anyway-and-how-many-are-there/. 
 52. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1362–63, 1366 (2012 & Supp. 2014). 
 53. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Drew DeSilver, 
supra note 51 (noting that Hobby Lobby is an S corporation). 
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that corporations and their shareholders can be indistinguishable.54 
The veil may be pierced because shareholders attempt to use the 
corporate form improperly to avoid personal liability,55 or in 
recognition of the corporation’s role as a placeholder for shareholders’ 
rights or an “extension of [their] beliefs,” neither of which are 
abandoned when they associate via the corporate form.56 
Early-stage corporations fit well into the Shareholder Primacy 
framework. The shareholders behave as owners in all relevant ways, 
including controlling the firm’s activities and assets. They are also able 
to control and police employee behavior and honesty. The board of 
directors is likely composed of the shareholders or those loyal to them. 
Profits earned or losses suffered by the firm are generally income or 
losses to the shareholders. That a court can pierce the corporate veil is 
evidence that shareholders own the firm: if the firm owned itself, there 
would be no one to whom to pierce. Stockholders’ unity with their 
corporations means that their choices directly impact their well-being, 
making pursuit of nonwealth goals unproblematic. 
It is difficult to maintain that a sui generis board hired capital (i.e., 
the shareholders who started the firm and elected the board); the 
board hires other production factors in place of shareholders only to 
 
 54. In the family-farm cases, discussed supra notes 48 and 50, the court used reverse veil 
piercing to arrive at the unity of identity where the farms’ natural owners enjoyed greater legal 
protections from creditors than did corporations. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Using Reverse Veil 
Piercing to Vindicate the Free Exercise Rights of Incorporated Entities, 16 GREEN BAG 2d 235, 
243–46 (2013). 
 55. E.g., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966). 
 56. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009); EEOC v. Townley 
Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 620 (9th Cir. 1988); Tyndale House Pubs., Inc. v. Sebelius, 
904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 115, 117 n.11 (D.D.C. 2012); Roepke v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 302 
N.W.2d 350, 351–53 (Minn. 1981); see id. at 352 (noting that other states have applied the 
doctrine in probate cases) (citing State v. North, 32 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 1947); In re Burr’s Estate, 
24 N.Y.S.2d 940 (Sur. Ct. 1941); In re Estate of Greenfield, 321 A.2d 922 (Pa. 1974)); supra 
notes 48–50; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the Corporate Law Professors’ Amicus 
Brief in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood, 100 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 4–5 & nn.17–18 
(citing sources characterizing corporations as associations of individuals). 
Family law also recognizes the concept, although it does not refer to it as veil piercing, 
when determining alimony, child support, and asset allocation between divorcing spouses. Brief 
of Amici Curiae Freedom X, et al. at 11–13 & nn.29–37, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 
& Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354; 13-
356) (citing cases from nine states). 
The concept is not new. See Daniel Lipton, Corporate Capacity for Crime and Politics: 
Defining Corporate Personhood at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, 96 VA. L. REV. 1911, 
1942–44 (2010) (citing early cases). 
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the extent that it is separate from them.57 It is likewise difficult to 
maintain that nonshareholder production factors joined to hire the 
board.58 Shareholders are almost certainly the ones with the special 
talent, product, or resource around which the enterprise was started.59 
Other constituencies like rank-and-file employees, creditors, or 
communities may not yet be in the picture. 
Shareholders set the corporation’s terms via the articles of 
incorporation at its formation. (The articles serve as a contract 
between the shareholders, in accord with the contractarian view of the 
firm.60) Their power is at its apex because they have not given away 
any of the sticks in the corporate bundle. Barring conflict among 
them, shareholders run their firm to achieve their desired ends, which 
may be laid out in the charter. In the event of conflict, the court will 
hold shareholders to their charter, though it is uncertain that courts 
would enforce a charter term opting out of shareholder wealth 
maximization.61 The next question is whether and to what extent 
shareholder rights and their corporate ends survive as their firm 
outgrows the Simple Structure. 
 b. Growth. As firms mature, they develop systems and 
infrastructures to facilitate efficient output creation. Firms of this 
complexity necessarily have components beyond direct shareholder 
reach, necessitating professional managers. Standardization becomes 
ever more necessary, both for internal monitoring and efficient 
production. Professor Mintzberg calls the fully mature version of such 
 
 57. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 58. Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 277 (describing the hiring and the giving up of rights 
in question as taking place when the corporation is formed); see supra text accompanying note 
35. But cf. Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 281 (describing the act of going public as the one 
that opts into the mediating hierarchy model). 
 59. Cf. Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 275. All of this is subject, of course, to each 
party’s relative bargaining power. When an “idea person” and a “money person” join to form a 
corporation, it is typically not merely the idea person who takes an equity stake. The money 
person will also take one, whether or not he or she also works for the firm. A special enough 
employee may likewise be able to bargain for equity, but at that point he or she becomes a 
shareholder with something special to offer the enterprise. 
 60. See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939–40 (Del. 
Ch. 2013). 
 61. See infra Section III.A. Although the enforceability under current law of a charter 
provision opting out of shareholder wealth maximization is questionable, this Article argues that 
one should be cognizable if effectively noticed. 
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a firm a Machine Bureaucracy, and notes that it is characterized by 
centralized control, formality, and conflict among groups that 
comprise the organization.62 
Share ownership may have spread beyond the founders,63 but it is 
still a close corporation in which many of the original owners take an 
active managerial role. Ownership and control, therefore, are typically 
“joined in the hands of the small class of incorporators” that holds a 
majority of shares,64 but that control is less direct and the minority can 
only influence firm affairs at the majority’s pleasure. 
Shareholder Primacy continues to have descriptive value. As in 
earlier stages, it is difficult to characterize anyone but the shareholders 
as hiring directors. “[T]he controlling shareholder or shareholder 
group enjoy[s] near-absolute power to determine the firm’s future.”65 
The minority can (in theory) enforce its rights via direct and derivative 
suits, connoting that shareholders own the firm and employ the 
directors to pursue their ends. Veil piercing continues to be viable 
because abusive shareholders’ assets are still relatively easily targeted 
via lawsuit. Yet shareholders have given up some of their control sticks 
by delegating a significant number of business decisions to managers. 
But an enterprise’s being successful enough that stockholders require 
managerial assistance to run it does not mean that they have given up 
their rights to their contracted-for ends, as expressed in the corporate 
charter. 
In line with Director Primacy, the board, directly and via 
subordinates, regularly hires production factors. To prevent abuse, 
directors owe fiduciary duties to all shareholders, including the 
minority, which can typically be fulfilled by treating the financial 
interests of all shareholders, qua shareholders, equally.66 Yet to the 
extent that the board is composed of controlling shareholders’ 
 
 62. MINTZBERG, supra note 47, at 167–69, 171, 183, 280–81. Public corporations may 
also be machine bureaucracies. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 63. Shares may become dispersed if the original shareholders sell, cause the firm to issue 
more shares to raise capital (such as when the firm goes public, discussed infra), or bequeath 
their shares to multiple parties. 
 64. Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign 
Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 906 (2004). This ownership structure typified even the largest 
firms of the first half of the nineteenth century. Id. 
 65. STOUT, supra note 1, at 16. 
 66. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971). 
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representatives,67 the control group can easily oust 
disfavored  directors. 
As Team Production predicts, however, the business judgment 
rule (BJR) makes it difficult for noncontrolling shareholders to 
vindicate their rights, freeing the board to act mostly as it pleases.68 
The board’s centralized power is consistent with its need to coordinate 
and rein in conflict among the organization’s internal constituencies. 
It must do so effectively if the firm is to produce efficiently. 
Nonetheless, the control group can replace the board anytime. And a 
classic corporate-law problem is that control groups, via their boards, 
abuse minorities’ rights. 
The shareholder class, therefore, continues to retain most control, 
and it can quickly retake that which it has delegated. Shareholders 
possessing minority interests have less power than others, but they are 
still owed fiduciary duties by the board and the shareholders who 
control it.69 Intrashareholder duties may be difficult to enforce, 
especially when combined with the board’s BJR protection.70 But 
courts are more willing to find fiduciary duty violations in close 
corporations than public ones.71 And the difficulty in proving a 
violation is a BJR feature that protects corporate pursuit of its purpose 
by insulating managerial decisions from opportunistic or litigious 
shareholders72 in all but the most egregious cases of wrongdoing.73 
Shareholders, in sum, properly retain the right to have the firm run in 
 
 67. As opposed to the controlling shareholders themselves. 
 68. Shareholders can seek redress by voting or suing. Their voting rights are limited to 
electing directors, approving charter and by-law amendments, mergers and sales of substantially 
all of the corporation’s assets, and voluntary dissolution; they have no authority to dictate 
expenditures made in the ordinary course of business. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 109, 211 
(2011 & Supp. 2015). As a practical matter, even the activities on which they may vote are 
subject to significant board influence. See Bainbridge, supra note 27, at 105 & n.133; Winkler, 
supra note 64, at 902–03; J. Robert Brown, Jr., Corporate Governance, Profit Maximization, 
and Hobby Lobby (Part I), THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (July 10, 2014), 
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/the-sec-governance/corporate-governance-profit-
maximization-and-hobby-lobby-par-1.html. 
 69. See In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496 (Del. Ch. 2013); Sinclair Oil, 280 A.2d 
at 720, 723. 
 70. See infra note 185 and accompanying text; see also infra Section II.B. 
 71. Perhaps because inter-shareholder abuse born of voting control is easier to identify 
than managerial abuse in a public corporation. 
 72. See infra Section II.B.2–3. 
 73. See infra Section II.B.1. 
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accord with their original contract, whether it calls for the pursuit of 
wealth or another end.74 
 c. Going public. Although some firms remain private while they 
take advantage of economies of scale and scope to expand, the capital 
inflow generated by going public can finance growth exceptionally 
well. As shares are issued, their ownership becomes diffuse. Where a 
large enough block exists to constitute de facto control, the analysis is 
similar to that in the preceding section.75 When no group is able to 
maintain control, the board of directors indeed becomes the supreme 
acting entity in the corporation, while shareholders are typically 
relegated to reacting to board decisions, and only if they can overcome 
collective-action problems.76 The firms’ size typically makes central 
authority necessary while making comprehensive central control 
impossible.77 Boards, therefore, monitor divisions to which acting 
authority has been delegated. Professor Mintzberg calls this structure 
the Divisionalized Form, and notes that it is characterized by output 
standardization, autonomous divisions centrally monitored against 
quantitative goals, and central control primarily of division 
leadership.78 Most control, in other words, is at least two steps 
removed from shareholders.79 
Occam’s razor80 counsels that, even in relinquishing control in 
order to go public, stockholders retain enough rights from their 
 
 74. See infra Section III.B; see also STOUT, supra note 1, at 16. 
 75. See ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE 
LAW § 10.04[D] & n.162 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing de facto control). 
 76. See supra note 68 and accompanying text; see also text accompanying note 30. 
 77. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 61–81 (1974). 
 78. MINTZBERG, supra note 47, at 215–25. Each division is essentially a self-contained 
entity that is monitored by and receives some support from the central authority (i.e., the board 
of directors and its direct reports in a typical corporation). 
 79. The divisions can be of different forms, including Simple Structures, Machine 
Bureaucracies, and other structures lacking strong central control. Id. at 217, 219, 224. The 
result is that intradivision control may also be decentralized. 
 80. Occam’s razor is the problem-solving principle that “the simplest of competing 
theories is preferable to the more complex ones.” BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S MODERN 
AMERICAN USAGE 584 (3d ed. 2009). More appropriately for present purposes,  
As Occam’s Razor warns, once the possibility of a more complex palette of human 
motivation is introduced, the power of [a] theory sharply declines, for unless [one] 
can specify when self-interest will trump ideology (or a sense of fairness, or professional 
socialization, or whatever other motive) it will prove of little use either descriptively 
or prescriptively.  
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bundles to make it worth their while. For the founders, this almost 
certainly includes wealth creation alongside other personal goals.81 For 
those who buy into a firm in which they lack control, wealth is more 
likely their motivation. Absent an explicit relinquishment, one should 
not assume that stockholders surrender their rights to their monetary 
or nonmonetary corporate ends to directors and other constituencies. 
After all, those rights are all that the shareholders have left. 
Shareholders presumably give up their sticks on the best available 
terms. The residual-interest/wealth-maximization stick is the most 
versatile of the bundle,82 allowing stockholders to pursue charitable 
and other nonwealth goals without a corporate or board intermediary 
deciding where to donate. It is presumably the right that they would 
relinquish last. Because profit motivates most stock purchases, one 
should assume, as the law does, that shareholders retain the wealth-
maximization stick.83 
Shareholder wealth maximization is thus a prerequisite, of sorts, 
to the existence of other purposes. Once established, stockholders 
should be free to alter firm ends if they believe that their nonwealth 
 
Cynthia R. Farina, Faith, Hope, and Rationality or Public Choice and the Perils of Occam’s Razor, 
28 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 109, 116 (2000). 
 81. See, e.g., J. Travis Laster, Revlon is a Standard of Review: Why it’s True and What it 
Means, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5, 12–14 (2013). Although going public is an efficient 
way to value the firm, cash out, and get rich, these are not founders’ only motivations. 
 82. After all, each shareholder knows best which causes he or she would most like to 
support. It may be most efficient for a shareholder to make money through his or her share 
ownership, and donate the money as desired. 
 83. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 469 n.16 (2002); 
SEC, STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 35 (1980); Roberta Romano, 
Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1599, 1611–12 (1989); see infra Part II. Although investors typically buy stock hoping to 
make money, profit need not be their only motivation. 
Delaware is the de facto leader in corporate law which other jurisdictions regularly imitate. 
This Article thus focuses primarily, but not exclusively, on its laws and jurisprudence. Although 
Delaware and most states’ laws adopt shareholder wealth maximization as law, see infra Part II, 
there are rare outliers where the strength of the norm is less certain—where it is less conclusive 
as a matter of positive law that stockholders retain the residual interest stick from the corporate 
bundle. See, e.g., Intertherm, Inc. v. Olympic Homes Sys., Inc., 569 S.W.2d 467, 471 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 1978) (“As a fiduciary, the officer or director has a strong influence on how the 
corporation conducts its affairs, and a correspondingly strong duty not to conduct those affairs 
to the unfair detriment of others, such as minority shareholders or creditors, who also have 
legitimate interests in the corporation but lack the power of the fiduciary.”). To the extent that 
this is the case, this Article argues that they should. 
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goals are best pursued via the corporate form and they sufficiently give 
notice to future share buyers. 
To the extent that shareholder control is at its nadir while 
shareholder wealth maximization supported by enforceable fiduciary 
duties lives on, Director Primacy accurately portrays the public 
Divisionalized Form. It is also consistent with widespread share 
ownership that shareholders would relinquish significant power to 
enable board members to take actions without cumbersome second-
guessing by multiple shareholders.84 Nevertheless, shareholders do 
have ultimate voting power, which they have occasionally used, for 
example, to resist takeovers.85 
Team Production’s characterization of the board as a mediating 
body is descriptive inasmuch as the firms’ divisions and other internal 
constituencies must be treated fairly and work together as needed, and 
shareholders need insulation from each other’s opportunism. Yet it 
becomes harder to explain why it is proper for a board to be hired by, 
and thus work for, a factor with at least some interests directly adverse 
to the firm, like creditor-vendors or communities with whom tax deals 
may be sought, when the board properly acts as a trustee for the 
corporation.86 It is also difficult to reconcile, absent an explicit choice 
to that effect, a decision by previously empowered shareholders to opt 
into a system that deprives them of their default and most versatile 
corporate stick,87 and one that need not be surrendered to reduce 
transaction costs—the right to profits. Shareholder hands-tying does, 
however, facilitate widespread stock ownership and all that it enables.88 
To the extent that veil piercing is no longer feasible because board 
members rather than shareholders are culpable for corporate 
wrongdoing, shareholders have indeed become more of a nonentity 
in the firm. But to the extent that that doctrine is unworkable merely 
because of the logistics of getting to many shareholders’ assets, it does 
not diminish the notion that shareholders own the firm, as 
 
 84. See infra Sections II.B.2–3; accord infra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 85. E.g., RITA RICARDO-CAMPBELL, RESISTING HOSTILE TAKEOVERS: THE CASE OF 
GILLETTE 165–216 (1997). 
 86. Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 280–81, 291; see also infra Section II.A.1. 
 87. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying and following text. 
 88. See infra Sections I.B.2.b, II.B.3; accord supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
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Shareholder Primacy holds.89 Shareholders are empowered to bring 
both direct and derivative suits, suggesting that they have retained the 
right to have directors work toward their ends. All of these 
characteristics are consistent with both wealth and nonwealth goals. 
2. On purpose 
The previous section shows that the corporation is a multifaceted 
entity capable of characterization across many dimensions. This 
section first distills the previous one’s observations into the concept of 
a flexible, shareholder driven, corporate purpose. It then briefly 
discusses the state’s reasons for chartering corporations. 
a. Corporate ends. Corporations may be characterized as a 
coincidence of property, contractual, and associational rights. The 
Simple Structure, especially in its extreme forms like incorporated 
family farms, is most clearly its shareholders’ property. At this stage, 
all incidents of ownership—all sticks in the ownership bundle—are in 
the shareholders’ hands. They relinquish some sticks as the firm grows, 
but not their residual interest. This interest, this Article asserts, entitles 
shareholders to have their firms run either to maximize their wealth 
or to further other contracted-for ends.90 This is equally true both of 
founding shareholders, who once possessed a complete property 
interest, and those who buy into the firm later. Shareholders do, 
however, surrender most control by the time the corporation goes 
public. But “separating control from ownership does not divest the 
 
 89. The doctrine could be workable if blame for bad acts could be isolated to a few 
shareholders. Cf. Stark v. Coker, 129 P.2d 390 (Cal. 1942); Jewell v. Victorian Vill. Internal 
Med., No. 08AP-919, 2009 WL 1314876, at *2 (Ohio App. May 12, 2009) (unpublished). 
 90. See infra Section III.A for a proposal of how shareholders may opt out of having the 
firm run for their benefit. In effect, instead of taking possession of the profit and spending it on 
their desired nonwealth goals, they have the firm do it for them. See supra note 82 and 
accompanying text. 
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owner of his rights.”91 The separation strikes this balance for the 
owners’ benefit, as discussed in Part II.92 
The corporation is, simultaneously, a contract-facilitation entity. It 
internalizes contracts to save transaction costs and to alleviate the cost 
of incompleteness in a long-term relationship.93 It also serves as a focal 
point at which production factors and customers voluntarily make 
value-creating exchanges.94 But the contractarian account that denies 
corporate existence, and therefore purpose,95 does not fully account 
for the firm as a historical bundle of rights, significant components of 
which shareholders retain. A natural corollary of the retention of 
rights is that the shareholder-owners are entitled to the wealth 
generated by their corporation, absent an explicit agreement to the 
contrary.96 Under a purely contractarian account of the firm, by 
contrast, shareholder entitlement to anything must be intuited absent 
an explicit contract to that effect.97 
Corporations, therefore, are not merely nexuses of contracts.98 
Although they need human action to enter into contracts, the 
contracts bind the firms even absent human agents. They are generally 
parties to the contracts for which they (or their boards) are nexuses. 
 
 91. Bainbridge, SWM Norm, supra note 1, at 1426 n.9 (emphasis added). This statement 
implies that there is something of the corporation to own. Some Delaware cases agree. E.g., N. 
Am. Catholic Edu. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007); Stahl v. 
Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1124 (Del. Ch. 1990); see also Fox v. CDX Holdings, Inc., 
C.A. No. 8031-VCL, 2015 WL 4571398 at *1, *24 (Del. Ch. July 28, 2015) (referring both 
to shareholders as owners and the influence of Director Primacy). But see Bainbridge, SWM 
Norm, supra note 1, at 1427 (stating that firms are not things that can be owned). 
 92. See infra Section II.B.2–3; see also supra text accompanying notes 37, 84. 
 93. “Over the course of such a relationship, issues arise that the participants did not 
anticipate. If it were possible to create a contract that specified every contingency at 
the outset (it is not), it would be costly beyond belief. The corporation facilitates the 
resolution of unforeseen issues by investing managers with command authority to 
address unanticipated circumstances without bargaining.” 
George A. Mocsary, Why the Corporation is Not Merely a Nexus of Contracts: A Response to Alexei 
Marcoux, LIBR. L. & LIBERTY (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-
forum/why-the-corporation-is-not-merely-a-nexus-of-contracts. 
 94. Marcoux, supra note 23. A “focal point” is a result to which individuals tend to 
gravitate in the absence of a distinct plan. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF 
CONFLICT 57–63 (1980). 
 95. Marcoux, supra note 23; Bainbridge, supra note 24. 
 96. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 97. See supra text accompanying note 25. 
 98. For more, see Mocsary, supra note 93. 
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Upon breach, corporations may be sued and their assets may be 
attached. They pay taxes. Corporations also enjoy constitutional and 
other higher-order rights that only make sense if they are placeholders 
for individuals.99 
Associational rights, in other words, are entwined in the 
corporation. These rights can be seen as arising both from 
shareholders’ mutual ownership of the corporate entity and their 
contracting through it. “Whether or not one accepts the notion that 
a corporation is a ‘person,’ some corporations are personal and 
associational in nature; that is, they are formed and owned by a single 
individual or by people who have decided to act in concert to 
undertake a trade or business.”100 When shareholders join together in 
a corporation, they do so to achieve their goals more efficiently than 
they otherwise could.101 That the collective undertaking is pursued via 
the corporate form need not strip it of its end.102 Stockholders choose 
their undertaking’s terms, including its end, at the firm’s founding. 
Later shareholders opt into the terms when buying their shares.103 
Shareholders, managers, suppliers, and others have different 
individual purposes for contracting with one another. As the 
 
 99. See supra note 56 and accompanying text; Ilya Somin, Religious Freedom in the 
Commercial Sphere, STAN. U. PRESS BLOG (Sept. 30, 2014), http://stanfordpress.
typepad.com/blog/2014/09/religious-freedom-in-the-commercial-sphere.html; cf. KLEIN ET 
AL., supra note 24, at 119–20 (describing the use of “loan-out corporations” to obtain legal 
benefits for their sole shareholders). 
The coincidence between some corporate and individual rights (whether statutory, 
constitutional, common-law based, etc.) does not mean that firms should always be treated as 
unitary with their shareholders. That would undermine some of the reasons for associating via 
the corporate form. See supra Section I.B.2.b; infra Section II.B.2–3. 
 100. J. William Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed: How Benefit 
Corporations Address Fiduciary Duties, the Dangers Created and Suggestions for Change, 2 AM. 
U. J. L. & BUS. 85, 102 (2012). 
 101. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 24, at 121–22 (describing the use of a shell corporation 
to make a merger more efficient); WILLIAM W. COOK, 1 A TREATISE ON STOCK AND 
STOCKHOLDERS, BONDS, MORTGAGES, AND GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 1 n.1 (3d ed. 
1894); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) (“A 
corporation is simply a form of organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends.”). 
 102. It may do just that, however, if incorporation necessarily causes a legally mandated 
rule to displace the founders’ original contract. This would happen, for example, if positive law 
required directors to run a corporation to maximize shareholder wealth, or to serve 
nonshareholder constituencies, irrespective of the founders’ wishes. 
 103. Or they step into the shoes of the previous shareholders some other way, depending 
on how they acquired their shares. Charter amendments can change the terms mid-stream, to 
some stockholders’ potential detriment. See infra Section III.C.2. 
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corporation aggregates these contracts, it aligns them toward the 
corporate purpose. “If . . . the invisible, intangible essence or air, 
which we term a corporation, can level mountains, fill up valleys, lay 
down iron tracks, and run railroad cars on them,—it can intend to do 
it.”104 Or, at least, the law can require managers to act as if the firm 
had such an intent. The law should attempt to keep corporate 
direction true while ensuring that all constituencies receive the 
benefits of their bargains.  
Managerial responsibility to pursue the corporate purpose 
becomes part of some contracts (e.g., those of managers), and dictates 
whether the firm enters into others (e.g., contracts with suppliers). It 
is the attainment of the corporate purpose that the board of directors 
must deploy its efforts and the firm’s resources. The board binds itself, 
under rules set by corporate law, to do so.105 This Article proposes that 
the law recognize (1) both profit-based ends—for shareholders’ or 
another constituency’s benefit—and those unrelated to wealth; and 
(2) that a diffusely held firm, including a fully Divisionalized Form, 
can inherit such a purpose. 
 b. The state’s purpose in chartering corporations. Governments 
charter corporations because they make great contributions to the 
prosperity of modern economies. The benefits include those resulting 
from the state’s selling the privilege of incorporation, liability risk 
reduction, capital lock-in, and efficient transacting. Allowing 
corporations to pursue ends other than shareholder wealth should 
expand the number of corporations in existence, fueling more growth. 
At the basest level, corporations provide revenue for the state in 
the form of filing and renewal fees,106 create an extra level of taxation 
on corporate income,107 and create a mechanism by which payroll and 
other taxes are reliably collected. The remaining business-enabling 
features, discussed next, create employment, a greater tax base, and a 
general circulation of wealth that results in economic growth. 
 
 104. JOEL P. BISHOP, 1 NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW UPON A NEW 
SYSTEM OF LEGAL EXPOSITION § 417(4) (8th ed. 1892). 
 105. If the board resigned, a new one would be bound to pursue the same end. 
 106. It is safe to say that Delaware’s revenue from corporate filings alleviates its citizens’ 
tax burden, for example, by making a sales tax unnecessary. 
 107. Subchapter S corporations are the noteworthy exception. See supra text accompanying 
notes 51–53. 
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Nicholas Murray Butler, former President of Columbia University 
and Nobel Peace Prize winner, said that “the limited liability 
corporation is the greatest single discovery of modern times, whether 
you judge it by its social, by its ethical, by its industrial or, in the long 
run,—after we understand it and know how to use it,—by its political, 
effects.”108 Limited liability shields shareholders from liability for their 
managers’ and co-owners’ acts, enabling diversification and closer-to-
optimal risk taking.109 This allows corporations to serve as laboratories, 
encouraging the private sector to experiment on socially beneficial 
undertakings.110 Under the contrary partnership rule where partners 
are jointly and severally liable for the partnership’s debts, few 
individuals would be willing to become fellow shareholders with many 
strangers.111 Without limited liability, modern corporations and the 
vastly expanded number of large undertakings that they make possible 
would be all but infeasible. 
The corporate form also facilitates efficient transactions between 
the parties who meet at the nexus of contracts. It alleviates the hold-
up problem, allowing investors to tie up capital with each other for 
the firms’ potentially perpetual existence.112 A shareholder cannot 
cripple the enterprise by unilaterally withdrawing its investment, 
unlike a partner who typically can.113 Shareholders also protect 
 
 108. He continued: “Even steam and electricity are far less important than the limited 
liability corporation, and they would be reduced to comparative impotence without it.” Nicholas 
Murray Butler, President, Columbia Univ., Address at the 143rd Annual Banquet of the 
Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York (Nov. 16, 1911). 
 109. Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996). Absent 
protection, managers will tend to pursue less risky projects even if they have a lower expected 
payoff. Bainbridge, supra note 27, at 110–14. Shielding managers will incent them to undertake 
riskier projects with greater expected payoffs. Id. Shareholders tend not to mind the risk because 
they can diversify it away. Id. But see George A. Mocsary, Statistically Insignificant Deaths: 
Disclosing Drug Harms to Investors (and Patients) Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 82 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 111, 160 (2013) (noting that investors value predictability). 
 110. Cf. Roberta Romano, The State as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State 
Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 210 (2006). 
 111. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 9, at 41–42. 
 112. See Margaret M. Blair, Locking In Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business 
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 404 (2003) (discussing “the problem 
that arises when one partner uses the threat of walking away from the business . . . to extract a 
greater share of the rents from the others”); see also In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 
17, 37 & n.4 (“Equity capital, by default, is permanent capital.”). 
 113. REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 601 (1997); see also, STOUT, supra note 1, at 77–78. 
Assuming that stock markets are semi-strong efficient, as most scholars and economists believe, 
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themselves from each other by limiting their respective control rights 
over firm activities.114 Corporations also reduce transaction costs by 
internalizing transactions, assuaging the costs of negotiating them 
across markets.115 As President Butler said, “[The corporate form] 
substitutes co-operation on a large scale for individual, cut-throat, 
parochial, competition.”116 
These benefits are consistent with, but neither depend on nor 
necessitate, a shareholder-profit goal: Shareholders desiring corporate 
ends other than wealth maximization ought to be able to purchase 
limited-liability protection. Capital lock-in can equally enable private 
undertakings and public works, which may be contracted out to 
existing private corporations or done by corporations directly 
chartered for the purpose.117 Efficient transacting benefits all 
undertakings. Yet the state, by selling the right to incorporate to the 
wealth-seeking supermajority of stockholders, also produces social 
benefits. 
II. SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION IS THE NORM AND THE 
LAW 
A corollary to the combination of (1) shareholders retaining the 
residual-interest stick from the corporate bundle, (2) that stick being 
the most versatile of the bunch, and (3) most stockholders investing 
in firms to make money, is that shareholder wealth maximization is the 
most natural default corporate purpose. This Part examines five of the 
most common objections to the shareholder wealth maximization 
norm and concludes that each is lacking. It also shows how facets of 
each claim that appear to weaken the norm in fact evince stockholder-
driven corporate purpose. Part III builds on shareholder wealth 
maximization, showing that the law’s recognition of nonwealth 
 
infra note 201, a selling shareholder bears his or her share of a firm’s public bad decisions, which 
have been capitalized into its stock price; buying shareholders bear the risk of unpublicized bad 
decisions. Loose distribution rules, however, undermine this benefit. See George A. Mocsary, 
The Embedded Firm: Corporate Governance, Labor, and Finance Capitalism—Commentary, 3 
ACCT., ECON. & L. 123, 126 (2014). 
 114. See infra Section II.B.3. 
 115. See Coase, supra note 22. 
 116. Butler, supra note 108, at 47. 
 117. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN 
THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780–1970, at 16–17 (1970). 
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corporate purposes would be both feasible and socially beneficial, and 
advocates for their validity. 
A. Claim #1: Improper Reliance on Dodge v. Ford 
One objection is that the germinal case of Dodge v. Ford Motor 
Co.118 either (1) improperly invented the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm, (2) is improperly relied upon as precedent for the 
norm, or (3) was in fact about shareholder, rather than directorial, 
fiduciary duties.119 The Dodge brothers, founders of the eponymous 
car maker and Ford shareholders, sued Ford to compel the continued 
payment of special dividends and enjoin the construction of a new 
manufacturing plant.120 In response to statements and testimony by 
controlling shareholder Henry Ford that he was running Ford Motor 
Company for the benefit of employees, customers, and others, the 
Michigan Supreme Court compelled the dividend payment but 
allowed the plant to be built, stating: 
There should be no confusion (of which there is evidence) of the 
duties which Mr. Ford conceives that he and the stockholders owe 
to the general public and the duties which in law he and his 
codirectors owe to protesting, minority shareholders. A business 
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of 
the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for 
that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice 
of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the 
end itself, to the reduction of profits, or the nondistribution of 
profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other 
purposes.121 
As a threshold matter, any defects in Dodge or its interpretations 
are irrelevant because Delaware courts have repeatedly reaffirmed the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm, including within the last 
year.122 That said, Dodge is instructive for its enunciation of the 
 
 118. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 119. E.g., Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. 
REV. 163 (2008). 
 120. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 673, 677. 
 121. Id. at 683–84, 685; ALLAN NEVINS & FRANK E. HILL, FORD: EXPANSION AND 
CHALLENGE,  1915–1933, at 99–100 (1957). 
 122. See infra Section II.C.1 and notes therein; RBC Capital Markets, LLC v. Jervis, 129 
A.3d 816, 849 (Del. 2016) (“Revlon neither creates a new type of fiduciary duty in the sale-of-
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longstanding view that managers must run their corporations for 
stockholder benefit. 
1. Dodge embodies ubiquitous societal understanding 
Some have argued that Dodge’s statement of corporate purpose 
was dicta unsubstantiated by legal authority.123 Yet Dodge merely made 
explicit that which had been an implicit and axiomatic part of the 
common law and general societal agreement. Societal understanding 
is critical to defining the corporate contract’s implicit terms because 
constituencies “ought to get out of their agreements what they were 
promised in their agreements.”124 
Dodge’s view of shareholders as the corporation’s residual 
claimants to whom the directors owe a duty of wealth maximization 
was a succinct restatement of the preceding several decades of 
Michigan common law.125 Hunter v. Roberts, Thorp & Co.,126 in 
particular, cited in Dodge’s analysis of whether a dividend should be 
forced,127 is strikingly similar to Dodge and is especially instructive. 
Roberts, Thorp & Co., a manufacturer of threshing machines, was 
 
control context nor alters the nature of the fiduciary duties that generally apply. Rather, Revlon 
emphasizes that the board must perform its fiduciary duties in the service of a specific objective: 
maximizing the sale price of the enterprise.”) (quoting Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 
1083–84 (Del.2001)); Andrikopoulos v. Silicon Valley Innovation Co., 120 A.3d 19, 25 (Del. 
Ch. 2015); In re Books-A-Million, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 11343-VCL, 2016 WL 
5874974, *11–12 (Oct. 10, 2016); OptimisCorp v. Waite, C.A. No. 8773-VCP, 2015 WL 
5147038, *61 & n.520 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2015); In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., C.A. No. 9322–
VCL, 2016 WL 3186538, *25–26 (Del Ch. May 31, 2016). 
 123. Stout, supra note 119, at 167–68; Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law 
After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 12 (2015). 
 124. Marcoux, supra note 23. 
 125. See Union City Lumber Co. v. Traverse City, L & M Ry. Co., 136 N.W. 463, 468 
(Mich. 1912) (“Stockholders of a corporation are permitted . . . to have a proportional share in 
corporate success.”); Stroh v. City of Detroit, 90 N.W. 1029, 1030 (Mich. 1902) (“[I]t is 
undeniable that [shareholders] bear the burden of the tax imposed upon the corporation, 
inasmuch as the shareholders constitute the corporation and indirectly own its property.”); 
Ackenhausen v. People’s Sav. Bank, 68 N.W. 118, 120 (Mich. 1896) (noting that depositors 
have a contractual relationship with a bank by which their interests are protected while “the 
profits of the business all belong to the stockholders.”); Butterfield v. Beardsley, 28 Mich. 412, 
425 (1874) (“If a quantity of oil had been drawn from a company well it must have belonged 
to the company, and ultimately to the shareholders according to their respective stockholding 
rights. The same must be true of the well itself, and of the other property.”); infra notes 126–
132 and accompanying text. 
 126. 47 N.W. 131 (Mich. 1890). 
 127. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 673, 682 (Mich. 1919). 
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sued by a former shareholder’s estate to compel the payment of 
dividends.128 Unlike in Dodge, the board maintained that it refrained 
from paying dividends as part of its long-term business strategy.129 The 
Supreme Court of Michigan ratified the lower court’s statement that: 
“It is undoubtedly true that the ultimate object for which every 
corporation of the character of the one under consideration [machine 
manufacturing] is formed, is the payment of dividends to its individual 
members.”130 Directors, the court said, “are the legally appointed 
agents and trustees of the stockholders.”131 The dissent agreed on both 
points.132 Other states had similar case law,133 and contemporaneous 
treatises agreed.134 Diffusely held corporations were among those 
 
 128. Hunter, 47 N.W. at 131. Suits attempting to compel the payment of dividends were 
not uncommon around the turn of the century. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 131, 133. Absent disparate tax treatment, dividends and capital appreciation are 
interchangeable ways in which to realize gains on a stock investment. 
 131. Id. at 133. 
 132. Id. at 138, 139. 
 133. See, e.g., U.S. Radiator Corp. v. State, 101 N.E. 783, 785 (N.Y. 1913) (“A share of 
corporate stock is the right which the shareholder has to participate . . . in the surplus profits of 
the corporation on a division, and in the assets or capital stock remaining after payment of its 
debts on its dissolution or the termination of its active existence and operation.”); People ex rel 
Venner v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 111 A.D. 183, 187 (N.Y. App. Div. 1906) (“The stock owned by 
[a shareholder] makes him the equitable owner of an undivided fractional part of the future 
assets of the company . . . . The stockholder’s rights in the profits of the business flow from his 
proprietary interest, and have no analogy to the rights of a contract creditor.”); Lord v. Equitable 
Life Assurance Soc., 94 N.Y.S. 65, 78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1905) (“Directors of a corporation are not 
vested with the title to the property of the corporation. They are agents of the corporation, upon 
whom duties devolve of management and care—the exercise of corporate powers for the benefit 
of the equitable owners of the corporate property, the stockholders. The directors are the 
trustees, and the stockholders are the cestuis que trust.” (quoting Dykman v. Kenney, 154 N.Y. 
483, 491 (1897)) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)); Jones v. Terre Haute & 
Richmond R.R. Co., 57 N.Y. 196, 205, 206 (1874) (“[A] stockholder in a corporation has an 
interest, in proportion to his stock, in all the corporate property, and has a right to share in any 
surplus of profits arising from its use and employment in the business of the company” and “[the 
corporation’s] affairs [are] managed by the directors as trustees for the stockholders.”); King v. 
Patterson & Hudson R.R. Co., 29 N.J.L. 82, 88 (1860) (“The directors are the agents of the 
corporation, and in their official capacity agents of the stockholders also.”); Brightwell v. 
Mallory, 18 Tenn. 196, 198 (1836) (stating stock entitles its holder “to his proportion of the 
profits or dividends which may be declared from time to time, and, when the institution closes 
the business, to his proportion of the capital stock and profits which may remain to be divided”). 
 134. ARTHUR W. MACHEN, JR., 1 A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF CORPORATIONS 
§§ 496, 508, 1313 (1908); COOK, supra note 101, §§ 12, 641, 643, 648 (aggregating dozens 
of cases); HENRY O. TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS HAVING 
CAPITAL STOCK §§ 558–59, 564, 567, 692 (1884). 
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understood to be managed for shareholder benefit.135 Stockholders’ 
contracts with their firms demanded wealth maximization. 
The Great Wall Street Scandal of 1905 provided an opportunity 
for all facets of society to express their views on the topic. The scandal 
was ignited by the revelation that managers of several insurance 
companies—the corporations most quickly and thoroughly to adopt a 
business model separating ownership from control—were using 
company funds for both direct personal benefit and to finance political 
campaigns.136 The uproar over the contributions and abuses was 
massive, and based primarily on the common understanding that 
corporate managers were “thieves and embezzlers” improperly 
spending “other people’s money”137—money that belonged to 
policyholder- and stockholder-owners.138 It soon became clear that 
other firms’ managers were equally culpable.139 Condemnation was 
universal, coming from the public,140 media,141 religious leaders,142 
state politicians,143 congress,144 and even President 
Theodore Roosevelt.145 
Managers were seen as both stealing outright and creating “forced 
political association”146 between owners and candidates whom the 
owners disfavored, and who enacted laws insulating managers from 
owner lawsuit.147 One writer described these latter measures as 
 
 135. Small investor groups dominated even the largest firms until the mid-nineteenth 
century. Winkler, supra note 64, at 906–12. Soon thereafter, however, starting with railroads 
and insurance companies and spreading rapidly to other firms, separation of ownership from 
control became the norm. Id. 
 136. Id. at 887–93. 
 137. Id. at 887, 893. 
 138. Some insurance companies were organized as mutual companies, where policyholders 
are the firms’ owners and are entitled to dividends, while others were organized as stock 
corporations. Id. at 901. Both policyholders and stockholders were considered owners from 
whom managers were stealing. Id. at 900–01, 905–06, 910–11. “[T]he funds held by the firm 
did not belong to the company per se as some distinct entity with its ‘own’ money.” Id. at 894. 
 139. See id. at 906–12. 
 140. Id. at 891, 893–95. 
 141. Id. at 893, 915–16. 
 142. Id. at 893–94. 
 143. Id. at 888, 893. 
 144. Id. at 924, 929. 
 145. Id. at 920. 
 146. Id. at 895–98. 
 147. Id. at 907–09; see id. at 909–12. 
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“designed to protect the policy-holders from their own servants.”148 
Managers defended on the ground that they were serving owner 
interests, referring to themselves as the owners’ trustees.149 
Shareholder and policyholder interests were the benchmark. That 
ownership and control diverged was not seen as destroying ownership 
interests. The principal-agent view of the firm was taken for granted.150 
This understanding continues. 
Notwithstanding the potential—and actual—managerial abuse 
that accompanied the rise of the manager-controlled corporation, the 
model was spectacularly successful, resulting in extraordinary 
growth.151 Yet the costs of weaker managerial accountability were 
impossible to ignore. The new model’s unprecedented capacity for 
wealth creation ensured its survival,152 even while the potential for 
managerial abuse ballooned. It is logical, therefore, that courts would 
make the shareholder-wealth-maximization standard of conduct more 
explicit, while preserving the benefits that came with the new 
manager-friendly standard of review.153 This era also saw the advent of 
the BJR.154 Section B analyzes the BJR after the following brief 
discussion of how construing Dodge as a controlling-shareholder case 
is consistent with the shareholder wealth maximization norm. 
2. A controlling-shareholder analysis of Dodge supports a shareholder-
driven approach to corporate purpose 
Some scholars view Dodge as standing only for the proposition that 
majority shareholder Henry Ford could not freeze “protesting, 
minority stockholders”—the Dodge brothers—out of their special 
dividends.155 Ford very likely was attempting to deprive the Dodge 
 
 148. Id. at 900 (quoting The Skeleton in the Insurance Closet, COLLIER’S, Oct. 14, 1905, 
at 13) (emphasis added). 
 149. Id. at 890, 898. 
 150. Id. at 873–76, 911–14, 918–23. 
 151. Id. at 909–10; see also STOUT, supra note 1, at 103–04. 
 152. See Sharfman, supra note 14, at 401–06; text accompanying note 151. 
 153. See infra Section II.B.1. 
 154. Id. at 908. 
 155. E.g., D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 315–20 
(1998); Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 301–02; Cynthia Williams, The Future of Shareholder 
Wealth Maximization: A Response to George Mocsary, LIBR. L. & LIBERTY (Dec. 23, 2013), 
http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/the-future-of-shareholder-wealth-maximization-
a-response-to-george-mocsary. 
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brothers of Ford’s generous special dividends, which the Dodge 
brothers were using to finance their car company.156 Yet an improper157 
dividend freeze-out is at base a situation in which shareholder wealth 
is not being maximized in a close corporation. In the archetypical 
situation, managers redistribute wealth to themselves at the expense 
of shareholders generally. In a freeze-out, a controlling shareholder or 
group, through board control, appropriates wealth from a subset of 
shareholders.158 Both are unacceptable because they impede long-term 
stockholder wealth. Both apply with equal strength to situations 
where managers or empowered shareholders are impeding other 
nonwealth corporate ends. 
If, as interest-balancing theories suggest, the board of directors 
has plenary power159 in a firm to serve various constituent interests as 
corporate (as opposed to shareholder) needs dictate, then Henry Ford 
did exactly what he was supposed to via his board: fight off a genuinely 
threatening160 competitor. He was thus serving all corporate 
constituencies by working toward the continued health of Ford Motor 
Company. Indeed, and also in accord with shareholder-interest-driven 
theories, he pursued even the Dodge brothers’ interests, qua Ford 
 
The reason not to view Dodge as a freeze-out case is that the court tied its prohibition on 
the nondistribution of profits to Ford’s (supposed) altruism. Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668, 684 
(Mich. 1919); see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Is Dodge v. Ford Motor Company a close 
corporation/controlling shareholder case?, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (May 5, 2012), 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2012/05/is-dodge-v-ford-
motor-company-a-close-corporationcontrolling-shareholder-case.html. 
 156. See NEVINS & HILL, supra note 121, at 89–91 (noting that Ford’s proposal would 
have left the Dodge brothers with a $120,000/year normal dividend instead of 
$1,200,000/year if the special dividend were also paid); Smith, supra note 155, at 316 & n.201; 
Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 301 & n.132. 
 157. It is proper for a board to refuse to pay dividends to pursue long-term firm value 
rather than accede to a short-term demand for cash from a minority shareholder. 
 158. In the absence of dividend payments, minority shareholders can only see a return on 
their investments by collecting a salary or selling their shares to realize capital gain. Cf. supra 
note 130. The former is only possible if the controlling shareholder assents, and the latter is 
typically very difficult in the absence of a public share market. That said, shares of the 
spectacularly successful Ford Motor Company were likely much easier to sell to a third party 
than other stock was, albeit at a risk discount. By contrast, even in the absence of a dividend, a 
controlling shareholder can pay him or herself a salary and sell his or her controlling interest to 
fully realize capital gain. 
 159. See supra Section I.A.3; infra Section II.E. 
 160. NEVINS & HILL, supra note 121, at 8, 394. 
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shareholders, via the increase in value that Ford Motor Company 
would see from Dodge Motorcar’s loss of a reliable source of capital. 
B. Claim #2: The Business Judgment Rule Does Not Require Managers 
to Maximize Shareholder Wealth 
The next argument is that managers have no “enforceable legal 
duty to maximize shareholder wealth” because, under the BJR, they 
have wide autonomy in managing their firms’ affairs and are routinely 
exculpated from liability despite having lost firm money.161 This 
argument conflates the standard of managerial conduct with the 
standard that courts use to review it. Managerial duties to pursue 
shareholder wealth are regularly enforced with varying standards of 
review appropriate to different situations. These standards, which 
developed organically through the common law, presumably strike an 
equilibrium between shareholder power and managerial 
accountability. They are consistent with enabling boards to efficiently 
pursue stockholder ends. 
1. The business judgment rule 
Managers must attempt to maximize shareholder wealth, but they 
need not succeed. Shareholder wealth maximization, as it is 
adjudicated under the BJR, is a standard of conduct to which 
managers must adhere. It does not require a particular financial result, 
much less optimal decision making that results in actual wealth 
maximization. Managers incur no liability for injury to their 
corporations resulting from actions pursued in good faith and with 
reasonable care.   
The BJR is the standard against which manager pursuit of 
shareholder wealth is reviewed. Absent some incentive irregularity—
evidence suggesting that managers either acted self-interestedly or 
otherwise contrary to their duties—courts will abstain from a fairness 
review of managerial decisions and presume that they were made in 
pursuit of shareholder wealth.162 In this case, the review is essentially 
 
 161. STOUT, supra note 1, at 25, 29–31; see, e.g., David Millon, Radical Shareholder 
Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013, 1020 (2013); Mitchell, supra note 1, at 623–24, 626, 
631–32. 
 162. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see Kamin v. Am. Exp. Co., 383 
N.Y.S.2d 807, 812 (Sup. Ct. 1976). This Article’s framework for analyzing the BJR considers 
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no review. If an incentive irregularity is present, however, the depth of 
review varies. 
Where managers’ acts are not suspected of being tainted with a 
financial interest, lack of independence, or an entrenchment motive, 
scrutiny remains low. Courts will typically intervene only if managers 
were grossly negligent in informing themselves about an issue;163 
“absent a conscious decision, failed to act”;164 had no rational basis for 
their decision;165 or engaged in fraud or other illegality.166 A finding of 
fault under these categories is rare—to the point that they are best 
thought of as indicators of an otherwise unseen 
incentive  irregularity.167 
When the board must decide whether to accept a takeover bid, 
there is an “omnipresent specter” of board entrenchment at 
shareholder expense because bid acceptance will usually result in the 
board members’ losing their jobs.168 If the board rejects a bid, Unocal 
 
the typical categorization of inquiries into managerial behavior concerning the duties of loyalty 
and care largely irrelevant. See, e.g., Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (Sup. Ct. 1944) 
(distinguishing between the BJR and the “rule of undivided loyalty”). But see Brehm v. Eisner, 
746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (referring to good faith as “a key ingredient of the business 
judgment rule”). Relevant for present purposes are the situations in which courts will employ 
their equity powers not to defer to the board’s broad statutory authority to run the firm. Bodell 
v. Gen. Gas & Elec. Corp., 140 A. 264, 267 (1927). The Delaware Supreme Court firmly 
presumed the validity of board actions. Id. The Chancery Court, which perhaps better explained 
the tension between statutory authority and equity, instead put the burden on the board to prove 
the fairness of the challenged transaction. Bodell v. Gen. Gas and Elec. Corp., 132 A. 442, 446, 
448 (Del. Ch. 1926). 
 163. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). 
 164. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813 & n.7; see Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 
(N.J. 1981). 
 165. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 (citing Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 
1971)). 
 166. Sinclair Oil, 280 A.2d at 722; Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779–80 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1968); Kamin, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 812; In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 
693, 753 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
 167. In the case of a positive law violation, proof of the violation serves to create liability. 
Yet even this category may be considered a sign of a hidden incentive irregularity given that the 
violation may have been committed to advance corporate goals. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 
N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979) (dealing with bribes made to secure business). In cases where the 
manager benefits from the illegality, he or she has a material financial interest or is simply robbing 
the firm. See infra text accompanying note 171. 
 168. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954, 955 (Del. 1985); see also 
Laster, supra note 81, at 11–18 & n.45 (listing reasons for managerial misbehavior in the 
takeover context); J. Travis Laster, Omnicare’s Silver Lining, 38 J. CORP. L. 795, 808–11, 816 
(2013) (same). 
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Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum mandates an intermediate level of scrutiny: 
the board must prove that it reasonably perceived a threat to the 
corporate enterprise and that its response was “reasonable in relation 
to the threat posed.”169 If the board makes this showing, the burden 
shifts back to the plaintiff to show another reason for overturning the 
board’s decision.170 
Where managers have a material financial interest in their decisions 
or lack independence, the incentive irregularity is obvious and courts 
will shift the burden of proof to managers and require them to prove 
that their actions were entirely fair to the corporation.171 
2. The rule as bargain between shareholders and management 
This combination of a strict wealth maximization principle and a 
stepped standard of review results from an implicit bargain172 between 
shareholders and managers: shareholders would not invest in a firm if 
managers could whimsically deploy their investment to serve other 
constituencies, and managers would not work for a firm if accepting 
employment meant that they had to guarantee optimal returns. 
Managers know the business under their charge best, and should 
be allowed to use their discretion in running it. The BJR protects 
managers from shareholder second-guessing. It is in shareholders’ 
interests to offer managers this protection for actions taken in good 
 
 169. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953, 955. The distinction between Unocal, which applies in 
contexts where there is no inevitable sale of the company or transfer of control that would subject 
shareholders to the risks and consequences borne by holders of minority shares, and Revlon v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), which applies where such a sale or 
transfer of control is certain, is discussed supra Section II.C.1 and note 203. Revlon is properly 
considered a subcategory of Unocal in which the board has fewer courses of action available to 
it. See Laster, Revlon, supra note 81, at 11–12; David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 
10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181, 188–93, 198–202 (2013). Revlon thus provides an intermediate-
plus form of scrutiny. 
 170. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 (requiring “judicial examination at the threshold before the 
protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred”). The Unocal test is quite 
permissive in its implementation. Bernard S. Sharfman, The Tension Between Hedge Fund 
Activism and Corporate Law, 1 J. L., ECON. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2016). 
 171. Laster, supra note 168, at 812; Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 
1983); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); see Sharfman, supra note 14, at 
399,  410. 
 172. That it is a bargain is evidenced by the ability of the shareholders to alter the default 
terms of their relationship with managers in the certificate of incorporation. DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(7), 141(a) (Supp. 2015); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 351 (2011) 
(statutory close corporations); accord infra note 178. 
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faith and with appropriate care to ensure closer-to-optimal managerial 
risk taking.173 Shareholders thus bind themselves to be unable to sue 
managers, save in the presence of grave incentive irregularity or 
potential for abuse.174 
In the absence of abuse, less day-to-day accountability to 
shareholders—more authority in the board—is typically more efficient 
because it reduces transaction costs, facilitates coordination, reduces 
the cost of disputes, and the like.175 Yet when an incentive irregularity 
is present, the need for accountability176 increases. The BJR’s stepped 
standard of review fulfills the bargain between shareholders and 
managers. 
3. The rule as bargain among shareholders 
The BJR, combined with public shareholders’ meager retained 
control rights,177 also fulfills a hands-tying bargain among 
shareholders.178 Managers have the most direct knowledge about the 
business, and are therefore best positioned to make corporate 
decisions.179 Individual shareholders, with their diverging interests, 
benefit by enabling managers to act independently, free of the risk of 
other shareholders suing managers for making “wrong” decisions that 
were undesirable to the plaintiffs only.180 Some shareholders would 
lack the resources to sue, resulting in managers catering to both 
litigious shareholders and judicial expectations.181 A positive side effect 
of this bargain is that shareholders are also less able to act 
 
 173. See supra note 108. 
 174. See Bainbridge, supra note 27, at 108–09; Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 312; supra 
Section II.B.1. Even uninhibited by the BJR, shareholders only get to make a case on the merits. 
 175. See Sharfman, supra note 14, at 402–05; Bainbridge, supra note 27, at 105–06. 
 176. “Accountability” means just that—that managers must account for their actions. If 
they do they are not liable. See supra Section II.B.1; supra note 174. 
 177. See supra note 68. 
 178. As with the bargain between shareholders and management, this contract is alterable. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(7), 141(a) (Supp. 2015); see also id. § 351 (allowing statutory 
close corporations); accord supra note 172. 
 179. See Bainbridge, supra note 27, at 106. 
 180. STOUT, supra note 1, at 9, 68, 76–83; Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 557. 
 181. See Sharfman, supra note 14, at 409; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director 
Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769 (2006). 
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opportunistically, to the business’s long-run detriment, with respect 
to other constituencies.182 
It is also inefficient and expensive for the firm and its managers to 
be fighting lawsuits rather than pursuing the firm’s ends. Given that 
managers are the best-positioned decision makers, the BJR is therefore 
also a contract among shareholders to keep judges, who “are not 
business experts” and are expensive to use, from deciding firm 
policy.183 
* * * 
Weakness is a strength when it comes to credible commitment. 
Shareholders voluntarily tie their hands vis-à-vis managers and one 
another—and, by extension, employees, bondholders, and other 
constituencies—via the BJR to enable their collective enterprise to 
efficiently pursue their ends. The law assumes, but the BJR’s reasoning 
does not demand, a pecuniary end. Shareholders are entitled to have 
their firms run to pursue those ends,184 and retain the ability to enforce 
their rights in the most obviously dire circumstances. An unfortunate 
side effect of this bargain, however, is that it provides good cover for 
managerial actions misaligned with shareholder goals.185 That does 
not, however, change the propriety of those actions.186 
 
 182. See STOUT, supra note 1, at 74, 80, 85; infra text accompanying and following 
note 226. 
 183. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); see Bainbridge, supra 
note 27, at 106, 117–24. This notion is not new. Hunter v. Roberts, Throp & Co., 47 N.W. 
131, 131 (Mich. 1890) (“Whether a corporation can safely make a dividend involves the exercise 
of knowledge and judgment, and the power of deciding this question should not be taken from 
the directors, and assumed by the courts, unless it clearly appears that the directors have mistaken 
their legal duties. Any other rule would lead to the frequent intervention of the courts, to the 
substitution of the court for the board of directors, and in very many instances, would prove 
disastrous to the best interests of the corporation and its stockholders, and the business . . . 
would be seriously hampered and retarded.”). 
 184. The opposite view taken to its extreme, would allow, for example, a target board in a 
takeover bid to reject the bid purely for the benefit of the bidder’s shareholders, who the board 
may believe are not getting a good value. Supra Section I.A.3; STOUT, supra note 1, at 88–89. 
 185. See STOUT, supra note 1, at 32–33; Laster, Revlon, supra note 81, at 28 (observing 
that an admission of improper behavior is all but necessary under the lowest levels of BJR 
review); J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit 
Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 15 (2012) (same). Compare infra text 
accompanying notes 190–191 (discussing the negative effects on shareholders of potentially 
disloyal actions by Time’s board) with infra text accompanying notes 192–193 (discussing the 
positive effects on shareholders of likely proper actions by Airgas’s board). 
 186. Accord Yosifon, supra note 169, at 223–26. Scholars differ on the extent to which 
shareholder wealth is pursued by managers. See infra notes 357–358 and accompanying text. 
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C. Claim #3: The Common Law Has Disclaimed Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization 
Just as the common law has not indirectly foreclosed shareholder 
wealth maximization via the BJR, it has not done so directly, either. 
The arguments to the contrary fall into two categories: (1) the 
Delaware Supreme Court has not stated that shareholder wealth 
maximization is the standard to which corporate boards’ conduct is 
held, and (2) boards’ fiduciary duties run to “the corporation and its 
shareholders,” rather than solely to the shareholders. These arguments 
are grounded in judicial language that, viewed in isolation, may 
suggest that pursuing shareholder interests is optional. When 
examined in proper context, however, it is clear that the referenced 
language mandates long-term pursuit of stockholder interests, which 
are appropriately presumed to be shareholder value which may (but 
need not) be best achieved by maximizing stock price today. 
1. The proper time horizon 
Many cases contain disclaimers of short-term shareholder wealth 
maximization that, read in isolation, may be read to disclaim wealth 
maximization altogether. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time 
Inc. and Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas Inc., for example, 
state that a corporate board “is not under any per se duty to maximize 
shareholder value in the short term.”187 Both courts note, however, 
that the boards’ actions were acceptable because they were pursuing 
“long-term value for the stockholders.”188 In Unocal and elsewhere, 
 
 187. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 98 (Del. Ch. 2011) (citing 
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1990)); see, e.g., STOUT, 
supra note 1, at 30 (citing Airgas as a disclaimer of shareholder wealth maximization); Blair & 
Stout, supra note 11, at 304 & n.146 (noting that the Time court allowed the board to reject a 
tender offer to preserve “Time culture,” with no connection to long-term shareholder wealth); 
Williams, supra note 155 (same). 
 188. Time, 571 A.2d at 1149; Airgas, 16 A.3d at 102; see Time, 571 A.2d at 1148–50, 
1153–55; Airgas, 16 A.3d at 99–103. 
Other commonly cited disclaimers of short-termism include Unocal Corp. v. Mesa 
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) and Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1968); see, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 303, 308; Mitchell, supra note 1, at 613. The 
Unocal court stated that in deciding whether to fight a takeover bid, a board may consider, in 
addition to the price, “the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, 
customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally).” Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. 
But as Professor David G. Yosifon ably shows, these constituencies may only be considered if 
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Delaware’s Supreme and Chancery Courts have affirmed that it is a 
“basic principle that corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in 
the best interests of the corporation’s stockholders,” and have a “legal 
responsibility to manage the business of a corporation for the benefit 
of its shareholder owners.”189 
One might answer that both the Time and Airgas boards’ actions 
were “demonstrably not shareholder wealth maximizing” because 
they declined to sell their firms for a substantial premium.190 This is 
certainly true, in hindsight, in Time’s case where its board turned 
down an 80% per-share premium from Paramount only to see Time’s 
stock price gain a paltry 3.5% over the next fourteen years.191 Airgas’s 
stock price, however, “has remained above the offer price, and, in fact, 
 
doing so bears some connection to long-term stockholder wealth. Yosifon, supra note 169, at 
188–93, 198–202. The Unocal court said as much on the same page as its famous “constituency” 
quote. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (“[C]orporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the best 
interests of the corporation’s stockholders.”); see id. at 955–56, 956 n.11 (stating that a board 
need not accede to the desire of short-term shareholders whose interests may be averse to those 
holding for the long term). The Shlensky court did not intervene when the Chicago Cubs’ owner 
refused to install lights in Wrigley Field because “baseball is a daytime sport and . . . the 
installation of lights and night baseball games [would] have a deteriorating effect upon the 
surrounding neighborhood.” Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 778 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Yet the court recognized that such seemingly non-shareholder-serving actions were actually 
investments in long-term business reputation and health, wholly consistent with maximizing 
shareholder wealth. Id. at 780–81. 
 189. N. Am. Catholic Edu. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 
2007) (citing Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998)); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (citing 
Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)); accord In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 
A.3d 17, 37 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“[T]he standard of conduct . . . mandates that directors maximize 
the value of the corporation over the long-term for the benefit of the providers of equity capital, 
as warranted for an entity with perpetual life in which the residual claimants have locked in their 
investment.”); Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“The theory 
of our corporation law confers power upon directors as the agents of the shareholders; it does 
not create Platonic masters.”); Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (“It is 
the obligation of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the 
corporation’s stockholders . . . .”); see also Quadrant Structured Prods. Co. v. Vertin, 115 A.3d 
535, 546–47, 547 nn.13 & 18, 548 n.19, 551 (Del. Ch. 2015) (interpreting Gheewalla to 
require directors to maximize corporate value for the firm’s residual claimants, which are 
ordinarily stockholders, but may be creditors if the firm is insolvent). But see Williams, supra 
note 155 (“[T]he law—at least as decided by the Delaware Supreme Court—does not yet clearly 
articulate shareholder wealth maximizing as the standard of conduct in order for boards to meet 
their fiduciary obligations . . . .”). Whether, when, and to what extent other entities may be 
classified as residual risk bearers is a topic left for a future work. 
 190. Williams, supra note 155. 
 191. Steven Rattner, Merge at Your Own Risk, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2003, at A13. 
2.MOCSARY.FIN2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/16  12:31 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
1356 
has increased nearly 50% [as of 2014].”192 As of August 2015, Airgas 
stock was trading at a 70% premium over the $70 offer price of 
December 2009.193  In May 2016, Airgas was acquired for $143 per 
share.194 
In the short run, the BJR demands only loose adherence to 
shareholder wealth maximization.195 Where there is no inevitable sale 
of the company, or transfer of control that would subject shareholders 
to the risks borne by holders of minority shares, managers may forego 
short-run gains in exchange for greater long-term ones.196 This is a 
sensible default rule given the value-destroying potential of short-
termism,197 despite potentially legitimate disagreement over whether 
selling or holding would in fact create more expected present value.198 
At the “Revlon moment,” which occurs either when a company is 
certain to be sold, or when a transaction causes control to shift from 
a diffuse set of shareholders to a concentrated block, managers must 
maximize the short-term expected value199 realized by shareholders.200 
Courts mandate short-term shareholder wealth maximization in these 
situations because they are the last opportunities for shareholders to 
fully realize their returns on their investments or for minority 
 
 192. Edward B. Rock, Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, 21 U. Pa. L. Sch. 
Inst. L. & Econ., Research Paper No. 14-37 (alteration in original). 
 193. Airgas, 16 A.3d at 66; BLOOMBERG FIN. L.P., BLOOMBERG LAW COMPANY REPORT: 
AIRGAS, INC. 4 (2015) (custom report of Aug. 11, 2015 on file with author). 
 194. Air Liquide completes acquisition of Airgas, AIR LIQUIDE, 
http://www.airliquide.com/media/air-liquide-completes-acquisition-airgas (last visited Nov. 2, 
2016). 
 195. See also supra note 161 and accompanying text (citing sources relying on this fact as 
evidence against a wealth-maximization fiduciary duty). 
 196. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 176, 182 (Del. 
1986); Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 42–45 (Del. 1993); see also 
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); supra note 169. 
 197. See infra notes 349–357 and accompanying text. 
 198. Some corporations are properly formed as short-term enterprises. See infra notes 359–
360 and accompanying text. 
 199. Boards can consider factors other than merely price, including an offer’s feasibility, 
financing, legality, risk of nonconsummation, and the bidder’s identity and business experience. 
QVC Network, 637 A.2d at 44. 
 200. Id. at 46–47; Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184. As this Part shows, and contrary to popular 
claim, e.g., Williams, supra note 187; STOUT, supra note 1, at 30–31, it is not only at the Revlon 
moment that shareholder wealth is the proper endgame. Indeed, it would be arbitrary for a strict 
shareholder-wealth-maximization rule to come into play at the end of the firm’s life, but not at 
any time before. See also infra text accompanying and following note 226. 
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shareholders to be paid for their control premiums.201 Shareholder 
interests have also been aligned because there is no longer a divergence 
between those who would like to sell and those who would like to 
hold. The short run has caught up to the long run.202 At this point, 
the board of directors’ single-minded goal must be maximizing value 
obtained for shareholders’ stock.  It may only collaterally—essentially 
accidentally—protect nonshareholder interests if those interests create 
equivalent or greater value for shareholders.203 In sum, although 
directors “enjoy a remarkably wide range of autonomy in deciding 
what to do with the corporation’s earnings and assets,” long-term 
shareholder goals—assumed to be, but not logically confined to, 
shareholder value—cabin their discretion.204 
2. “The corporation and its shareholders” 
Neither, as some assert, has the common law disclaimed 
shareholder wealth maximization by describing directors’ duties as 
 
 201. Vice Chancellor Laster disagrees, arguing that the possible future loss of a control 
premium will be capitalized into current stock price. See Laster, Revlon, supra note 81, at 37–
47. This depends on very accurate knowledge about the future, and in any event, would be 
reflected in the stock price as an expected value. When the change in control actually happens, 
the full value of the premium is lost. 
Similarly, some scholars reject the notion that long-term shareholder wealth maximization 
is different from the short term, on the ground that short-term share price is always an accurate 
measure of today’s best estimate of future value creation. Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 304. 
But see STOUT, supra note 1, at 63–65. But the majority of Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis 
proponents (including one of its founders, Professor Eugene Fama) acknowledge that only the 
semi-strong form of the ECMH is a valid model of share prices, and that even this version is 
imperfect. Clifford Asness & John Liew, The Great Divide over Market Efficiency, INST. INV. 
(Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Article/3315202/Asset-Management-
Equities/The-Great-Divide-over-Market-Efficiency.html#.WAcCZJMrI5s; Lynn A. Stout, Are 
Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 611, 646–56 (1995). 
 202. TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., CIV. A. Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 
20290, at *6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (“In such a setting, for the present shareholders, there is 
no long run.”) (unpublished). 
 203. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185. Revlon is thus a subcategory of Unocal in which boards 
must focus directly on maximizing the price obtained by shareholders, considering other 
constituencies whose rights are “fixed by contract” only collaterally. Id. at 182. Revlon stated 
that it was applying Unocal. Id. at 176, 180–82, 184. Under Unocal, by contrast, boards must 
maximize long-term value, and they may do so via the well-being of other constituencies or, if 
the present value of selling is greater than that which may be generated by continuing to operate, 
by maximizing immediate sale price. See supra notes 169, 188. 
 204. STOUT, supra note 1, at 31; cf. supra text accompanying note 161. 
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flowing to both “the corporation and its shareholders.”205 This phrase 
was made famous in the Delaware Supreme Court case of Guth v. 
Loft,206 and has been cited by many opinions since, including Revlon 
and Unocal.  But nearly all agree that Revlon requires a stringent form 
of shareholder wealth maximization. And Unocal cited Guth for its 
proposition that “corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in 
the best interests of the corporation’s stockholders.”207 
Guth was a corporate opportunity case in which Loft, Inc., accused 
its Vice President, Guth, of usurping a corporate opportunity of Loft’s 
for the benefit of a firm owned by him and his family.208 The injury 
allegedly caused by Guth was directly to the corporation, with other 
constituencies impacted only indirectly, if at all. By nonetheless 
including shareholders—and no other constituency—as beneficiaries 
of the board’s fiduciary duties, the court showed that it considered 
harm directly to Loft, Inc., as synonymous with harm to Loft’s 
shareholder residual claimants, who formed the corporation with their 
ends in mind.209 Revlon’s and Unocal’s reference to the corporation—
when the issue was harm caused directly to shareholders denied a fair 
price for their stock—likewise supports this equivalency between 
shareholders and the corporation.210 As Vice Chancellor J. Travis 
Laster said, “This formulation captures the intuition that directors 
owe duties to the corporation for the ultimate benefit of the residual 
claimants.”211 Much of this intuition applies to the assessment of 
nonshareholder constituency statutes, discussed next. 
 
 205. E.g., Johnson & Millon, supra note 123 at 13 (citing Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225, 
238 (Del. Ch. 1938), aff’d sub nom. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939)); Millon, supra 
note 161, at 1031 (same); Blair & Stout, supra note 11, at 293 n.105 (citing Mills Acquisition 
Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1988)); Williams, supra note 187 (citing 
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 952, 954–55). 
 206. Guth, 5 A.2d at 510, aff’g Loft, 2 A.2d 225. 
 207. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179; Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955; see supra notes 200, 205. 
 208. Guth, 5 A.2d at 505–06, 510. 
 209. See also Yosifon, supra note 169, at 208–13 (noting that the phrase mentions only the 
shareholder constituency). 
 210. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179; Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953. 
 211. Laster, Revlon, supra note 81, at 28; see Quadrant Structured Prods. Co. v. Vertin, 
115 A.3d 535, 546–47, 547 nn.13 & 18, 548 n.19 (Del. Ch. 2015) (Laster, Vice Chancellor) 
(directors “owe fiduciary duties to the corporation for the benefit of all of its 
residual  claimants”). 
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D. Claim #4: Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes Have Invalidated 
the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm 
Another argument against the shareholder wealth maximization 
norm is that a majority212 of states (not including Delaware) have 
enacted nonshareholder constituency statutes that allow boards to 
consider the interests of nonshareholders.213 One view is that these 
statutes allow boards to serve nonshareholders without connecting 
their acts to shareholder interests. A more moderate view is that the 
statutes reaffirm that corporate boards may in fact pursue 
nonshareholder interests purposively or collaterally in their ultimate 
 
 212. Sources differ on how many states have enacted such statutes. Compare, e.g., Kathryn 
Acello, Having Your Cake and Eating It, Too: Making the Benefit Corporation Work in 
Massachusetts, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 91, 100 & n.51 (referring to thirty-three statutes and 
citing thirty-one) with Lyman Johnson & Prof. David K. Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby 
Lobby 19 (Wash. & Lee Pub. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, Accepted Paper No. 2014-19, Oct. 
8, 2014) (counting forty-one statutes in this prepublication version of Johnson & Millon, supra 
note 123). 
This Article considers twenty-nine statutes to qualify because they refer to nonshareholder 
interests: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756(d) (West 2015); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830(3) 
(West 2016); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 414-221(b) 
(2004); IDAHO CODE § 30-1602 (2013); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8.85 (West 2015); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(d) (LexisNexis 2010); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.1108A(1) (West 
2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4) (LexisNexis 2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
13-C, § 831(6) (2007); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-104(b)(9) (LexisNexis 2014); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156D, § 8.30(a)(3) (West 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) 
(West 2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.347(1) (West 2015); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.138(4) 
(2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1(2) (West 2003); N.M. STAT. ANN., § 53-11-35(D) 
(LexisNexis 2004); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (LexisNexis 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. 
§ 10-19.1-50(6) (West 2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(F) (LexisNexis 2015); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (2015); 15 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715(a)(1) (West 2013); 
7 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8(a) (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4 (2007); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 48-103-204 (2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 8.30(a) (2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
180.0827 (West 2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830(g) (2015). Other statutes, like ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. 10-2702 (2013) and VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-727.1 (2011), state only that a 
corporate board may, in the takeover context, determine that the interests of “the corporation” 
or “the corporation and its shareholders,” respectively, “may be best served by the continued 
independence of the corporation.” But the board must always decide whether to accept, reject, 
or ignore a bid. See supra text accompanying notes 164, 168–170. Virginia’s statute codified the 
common law by explicitly requiring directors to consider shareholder interests, even if corporate 
and shareholder interests are not seen as coincident. See supra Section II.C.2. 
 213. E.g., Johnson & Millon, supra note 123, at 14; see Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical 
and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579 
(1992). 
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pursuit of long-term shareholder wealth.214 Another possibility—
explicitly stated by three constituency statutes and fitting this Article’s 
approach to corporate purpose—is that the statutes allow (but do not 
require) shareholders to include non-shareholder-oriented purposes in 
corporate articles.215 B Lab, the nonprofit organization that has been 
labeling firms meeting its prosocial criteria as “Certified B 
Corporations” since 2007, apparently adopts this view.216 
The statutes appear, with some exceptions around the edges and 
one caveat, to line up rather consistently behind allowing corporate 
boards to consider nonshareholder interests provided that long-term 
shareholder wealth is the ultimate goal. All make considering 
nonshareholder interests optional in any given situation.217 At least six 
(21%),218 and as many as thirteen (45%),219 require directors to 
 
 214. See supra Section II.C.1. The narrowest view is that the statutes codify a version of 
the business judgment rule under which boards may consider nonshareholder interests only to 
maximize today’s stock price. If this were the correct interpretation, there would be no need to 
pass the statutes in the first instance. 
 215. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (2003); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-
104(b)(9) (LexisNexis 2014); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-204 (2012). An interesting 
variation on this scenario is that the state chartering agency might include in the certificate of 
incorporation purposes unrelated to shareholders as a condition of chartering the corporation. 
See supra note 46. (An alternate method for specifying conditions would, of course, be needed 
in states with unitary charters. See supra note 48.) This possibility would be most relevant to 
corporations otherwise formed to pursue nonmonetary private benefits for their shareholders. 
See infra Section III.B.4. 
 216. Corporation Legal Roadmap, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-
corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/legal-roadmap/corporation-legal-roadmap (last visited Sept. 8, 
2016) (stating that firms incorporated in states with constituency statutes can serve 
nonshareholder interests by including an appropriate charter provision, but that the best that 
firms incorporated in other states can do is write up a “Term Sheet [that] commits [the] company 
to consider stakeholders to the extent possible within the current corporate laws of [its] state”). 
 217. None of the statutes require boards to consider nonshareholder interests. See supra 
note 212 (citing statutes). In the process, the statutes ensure that no nonshareholders get the 
benefit of board fiduciary duties. Some are explicit in this. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) 
(2003); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(6) (2015); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) 
(LexisNexis  2003). 
 218. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 414-221(b) (2004); IDAHO CODE § 30-1602 (2013); MISS. 
CODE. ANN. § 79-4-8.30(f) (2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (LexisNexis 2004); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(F) (LexisNexis 2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830(g) (2015). 
 219. IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.1108A(1) (West 2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-
210(4) (LexisNexis 2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 831(6) (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
14A:6-1(2) (West 2003); 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8(a) (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-
33-4 (2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.0827 (West 2016). These statutes employ language which 
can be understood either to require boards to consider shareholder interests while allowing them 
to consider nonshareholder ones, or to make consideration of all constituent interests optional. 
2.MOCSARY.FIN2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/16  12:31 PM 
1319 Freedom of Corporate Purpose 
 1361 
consider shareholder interests; only two (7%) state that boards need 
not consider any particular constituency’s interests.220 Twenty-one 
(72%) of the statutes explicitly state that directors may consider the 
company’s long-term prospects when discharging their duties.221 Nine 
(31%) of the statutes explicitly apply only in the takeover context,222 
and another fourteen (48%) imply as much by referring to the 
corporation’s continued independence.223 
The sparse case law on the matter supports this interpretation by 
following the Unocal rule,224 but adds the caveat that the statutes 
generally appear to abrogate the Revlon subspecies of Unocal by 
allowing boards to consider nonshareholder interests even when 
shareholders will not have a later opportunity to monetize their 
 
Given the strong history of the shareholder wealth maximization norm, the former is more 
reasonable. 
 220. IND. CODE ANN § 23-1-35-1(d) (LexisNexis 2010); 15 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 1715(a)(1) (West 2013). 
 221. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756(d) (West 2015); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830(3) 
(West 2016); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 414-221(b) (2004); IND. CODE ANN § 23-1-35-1(d) 
(LexisNexis 2010); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.1108A(1) (West 2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
271B.12-210(4) (LexisNexis 2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156D, § 8.30(a)(3) (West 
2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) (West 2011); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 79-4-8.30(f) 
(2013); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.138(4) (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1(2) (West 2003); 
N.M. STAT. ANN.  § 53-11-35(D) (LexisNexis 2004); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) 
(LexisNexis 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 10-19.1-50(6) (West 2012); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 1701.59(F) (LexisNexis 2015); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (2015); 15 PA. STAT. AND 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715(a)(1) (West 2013); 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8(a) (1999); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4 (2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 8.30(a) (2010); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 17-16-830(g) (2015). 
 222. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756(d) (West 2015); IOWA CODE ANN. § 
490.1108A(1) (West 2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4) (LexisNexis 2012); MD. 
CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-104(b)(9) (LexisNexis 2014); MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.347(1) 
(West 2015); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (2015); 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8(a) (1999); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-204 (2012). Takeovers were 
often seen as value-destroying when most constituency statutes were passed. 
 223. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 414-221(b) (2004); IDAHO CODE § 30-1602 (2013); 805 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8.85 (West 2015); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) (West 2011); 
MISS. CODE. ANN. § 79-4-8.30(f) (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(4) (2015); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 14A:6-1(2) (West 2003); N.M. STAT. ANN.  § 53-11-35(D) (LexisNexis 2004); N.Y. 
BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (LexisNexis 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 10-19.1-50(6) (West 
2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(F) (LexisNexis 2015); 15 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 1715(a)(1) (West 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 8.30(a) (2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§ 17-16-830(g) (2015). 
 224. See supra notes 169–170 and accompanying text. 
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investments.225 Although certainly a weakening at one corner of the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm, Revlon situations are rare. 
The statutes can also be seen as legislatures weighing a need to ensure, 
at the last period, that nonshareholders get the benefits of their 
implicit and explicit contracts with firms226 against a need to ensure 
that shareholders get the benefits of their bargains with their boards. 
Inasmuch as stockholders, to protect their interests, yield power to 
boards to allow boards credibly to commit to fulfilling their 
contractual obligations, such weakening of Revlon is consistent with 
shareholder wealth maximization. Given the paucity of decisions on 
constituency statutes outside the Unocal/Revlon context, it is reckless 
to deem abrogated long-standing common law protecting stockholder 
ends. 
 
 225. Gut v. MacDonough, No. Civ.A.2007-1083-C., 2007 WL 2410131, at *8–9 (Mass. 
Super. Aug. 14, 2007) (unpublished); see also Basswood Partners, L.P. v. NSS Bancorp, Inc., No. 
CV9801634128, 1998 WL 59476, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 6, 1998) (holding that 
Connecticut’s constituency does not prevent shareholders seeking corporate records to pursue 
their ends) (unpublished). These two cases comprise all the decisions by courts of the states that 
passed the respective statute. Non-home-state courts tend to agree, but their decisions, of 
course, are not binding. Kloha v. Duda, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1237 (M.D. Fla. 2003); Dixon v. Ladish 
Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 746, 753 (E.D. Wis. 2011); Shepard v. Meridian Ins. Grp., Inc., 137 F. 
Supp. 2d 1096, 1113 (S.D. Ind. 2001); Hilton Hotels Corp. v. ITT Corp., 978 F. Supp. 1342, 
1346 (D. Nev. 1997); Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 845 (D. Minn. 
1986); First Union Corp. v. Suntrust Banks, Inc., No. 01-CVS-10075, 01-CVS-8036, CIV. A. 
01-CVS-4486, 2001 WL 1885686, at *5 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2001) (concluding that 
Illinois’s statute abrogated Revlon); see also Dugan v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., 
No. 2:09-cv-5099, 2012 WL 6194211, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2012) (holding that 
Pennsylvania’s statute does not create a cause of action against directors) (unpublished); Flake v. 
Hoskins, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D. Kan. 1999) (concluding that Revlon does not conflict with 
Missouri’s statute); Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., No. 97 C 8003, 1999 WL 
601039, at *12–13 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 1998) (concluding that Wisconsin’s statute abrogated 
Revlon) (unpublished). But see Nelson v. Ipalco Enters., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1080 (S.D. 
Ind. 2007) (appearing to abrogate both Unocal and Revlon); Crandon Capital Partners v. Shelk, 
181 P.3d 773, 783 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (concluding that New Jersey’s statute abrogated both 
Revlon and Unocal). Most scholars agree. See Bainbridge, Constituency Statutes, supra note 1, at 
991–94, 1015, 1019; James J. Hanks, Jr., Playing with Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes 
in the 1990s, 21 STETSON L. REV. 97, 107 (1991). An empirical study by Professors Christopher 
Geczy, Jessica S. Jeffers, David K. Musto, and Anne M. Tucker supports this conclusion. 
Christopher Geczy et al., Institutional Investing When Shareholders Are Not Supreme, 5 HARV. 
BUS. L. REV. 73, 105–14 (2015). 
 226. See Bainbridge, Constituency Statutes, supra note 1, at 1004–08; Mitchell, supra note 
1, at 634–40. 
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E. Claim #5: Corporations May Be Formed to Pursue “Any 
Lawful Purpose” 
A final assertion is that, under Delaware law, a corporation may be 
organized for “any lawful business or purposes,”227 and that because 
most corporate charters merely recite this or a similar phrase, directors 
of those firms have plenary power to disregard shareholder interests 
in favor of other legal goals.228 This evinces a misunderstanding of 
statutory “purpose” language. Current law does not grant managers 
free reign to determine—and alter at any given moment—corporate 
raison d’etre. This Article does, however, argue for shareholder 
freedom to charter corporations to pursue nonstandard ends if 
nonfounding shareholders are adequately noticed. 
1. The common law makes ignoring shareholder interests unlawful 
As an initial matter, this claim circularly implies that corporate 
charters can define what is lawful. Shareholder wealth maximization is 
a common-law rule,229 and corporate-law statutes are typically silent 
on the matter save in the cabined contexts of constituency statutes230 
and special corporation types, like benefit or nonprofit corporations.231 
Under their common-law fiduciary duties, it is by default unlawful for 
managers not to attempt to maximize shareholder wealth.232 
 
 227. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2011) (“A corporation may be incorporated or 
organized under this chapter to conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes, except as 
may otherwise be provided by the Constitution or other law of this State.”) (emphasis added); 
id. §102(a)(3) (“It shall be sufficient to state [in the certificate of incorporation], either alone 
or with other businesses or purposes, that the purpose of the corporation is to engage in any 
lawful act or activity for which corporations may be organized under the General Corporation 
Law of Delaware, and by such statement all lawful acts and activities shall be within the purposes 
of the corporation . . . .”). 
 228. E.g., STOUT, supra note 1, at 28, 32 (“Directors and executives can run corporations 
to maximize shareholder value, but unless the corporate charter provides otherwise, they are free 
to pursue any other lawful purpose as well. Maximizing shareholder value is not a managerial 
obligation, it is a managerial choice.”); Johnson & Millon, supra note 123, at 8–10, 13–14, 30 
(“[T]he board is free to advance the corporation’s mixed objectives over the objections of 
shareholders and at the expense of strict shareholder primacy.”) Other states have similar 
provisions. 
 229. See supra Sections II.A–C. 
 230. See supra Section II.D. 
 231. See infra Section III.C.1; note 241. 
 232. See supra Section II.B.1. 
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Shareholders may, via charter, only alter a common-law rule if they 
steer clear of “a result forbidden by settled rules of public policy.”233 
This test is easily failed by a panoptic view of modern purpose 
language: it is unreasonable and unfair to assume that shareholders—
most of whom invest for profit234—would, by specifying “any lawful 
purpose,” enable their boards to further any end desired by managers 
at any given moment. It would compound the inequity to presume 
that shareholders effectively waive their fiduciary rights given their 
bargained-for inability to undo management actions.235 More 
affirmative relinquishment of the wealth-maximization stick is needed 
to avoid injustice to equity investors. 
2. Tactical versus strategic purpose 
Despite managers’ inability to alter corporate ends, shareholders 
should be able to grant their boards authority to pursue nonwealth 
ends. Disaggregating the concept of corporate purpose into its 
“tactical” and “strategic” purposes clarifies both to what corporation-
law statutes typically refer when they speak of “purpose,” and the 
spheres in which managers have and lack sovereignty. 
A tactical, or operating, purpose is a firm’s allowable sphere of 
business, like selling insurance,236 brewing beer,237 operating a 
railroad,238 or making musical instruments.239 Tactical purposes were 
once part of the basis for cabining a firm’s activities and liability via 
the mostly abolished ultra vires doctrine.240 A corporation engages in 
 
 233. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 117–18 (Del. 1952). 
 234. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 235. See supra Section II.B.2–3; see also Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 1442–45 & nn.70–
71; Johnson & Millon, supra note 123, at 27–28. 
 236. See infra notes 246–250 and accompanying text. 
 237. See infra note 250. 
 238. See infra text accompanying note 250. 
 239. See infra note 252 and accompanying text. 
 240. The ultra vires doctrine held that activities that were not authorized by the corporate 
charter were void as a matter of law. This meant that (1) third parties contracting with a 
corporation on ultra vires matters could not enforce their contracts, and (2) that shareholders 
could prevent ultra vires corporate acts despite a board vote to the contrary. The harsh 
consequences for third parties led to the abolition of this first aspect of the doctrine. DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 124 (2011). Shareholders may, however, continue to derivatively or directly 
challenge charter violations. Id. § 124(2); Carsanaro v. Bloodhound Techs., Inc., 65 A.3d 618, 
647–54 (Del. Ch. 2013). This Article does not propose altering this balance in the ultra vires 
doctrine. 
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permitted operations in pursuit of its strategic purpose—the ultimate 
end of the corporation, of which shareholder wealth maximization is 
the archetypical example. 
Most corporate law statutes that authorize “any lawful purpose” 
should be seen as referring to tactical purposes.241 Although most 
states’ statutes allowed the formation of corporations for any lawful 
purpose since the early 1900s,242 those statutes required each charter 
to specify a given firm’s purposes in specific terms.243 It was only much 
later that states began allowing corporations to be chartered with 
multi-purpose language authorizing the firms to pursue any lawful 
purpose. Delaware, for example, amended its statute to include multi-
purpose language in 1967, before which formal purpose recitations 
were required.244 Its legislature presumably switched to the “any lawful 
purpose” language to enable firms to make value-enhancing tactical 
decisions, like taking advantage of synergies in expanding or adapting 
to market conditions, without having to engage in the guessing game 
of making “extensive recitals of all the conceivable types of business in 
which the corporation could engage.”245 
 
Corporate “powers,” which resemble tactical purposes, were another basis for cabining a 
firm’s activities. Courts applying the ultra vires doctrine often meshed the concepts. See infra 
note 253. 
 241. This Article asserts that this is the proper way to view most corporation-law statutes, 
including title 8, section 101(c) combined with section 102(a)(3) of the Delaware Code, DEL. 
CODE. ANN. (Supp. 2015). See supra note 227; infra notes 242–244 and accompanying text. 
Delaware, however, has recently complicated things by using “purpose” to refer, in the benefit-
corporation context, to “one or more specific public benefits.” § 362(a)(1). That benefit 
corporations, which must be formed to pursue multiple ends, were explicitly added to the 
Delaware General Corporation Law as a separate entity type, suggests that general business 
corporations cannot pursue any end chosen by managers at any given moment. Id. There would 
be no need for a new entity type if traditional corporations could be formed to pursue any 
combination of ends. 
 242. Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware’s General Corporation Law of 1899, 1 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 249, 269 (1976). 
 243. E.g., 21 DEL. LAWS ch. 273, § 7 (1899). 
 244. EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., 1 FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION 
LAW § 102.4 (5th ed. 2006). Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (Delaware’s current 
statute allowing a certificate provision stating that “all lawful acts and activities shall be within 
the purposes of the corporation”) with 21 DEL. LAWS ch. 273, § 7 (1899) (previous statute 
requiring a certificate provision specifying “[t]he nature of the business or objects or purposes 
proposed to be transacted, promoted or carried on.”). 
 245. WELCH ET AL., supra note 244, at § 102.4.  Note that the commentator equates a 
purpose with a type of business in which the firm may engage. TransUnion, for example, began 
in 1968 as a railcar-leasing company. Company History, TRANSUNION, 
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A few sample cases involving typical tactical purposes show that 
“purpose,” as used in corporate charters and statutes, refers to 
allowable firm operations. In People ex rel. Perkins v. Moss, Perkins, 
officer of an insurance company involved in the Great Wall Street 
Scandal, challenged his criminal indictment for making a nearly 
$50,000 political contribution from corporate funds.246 Although split 
on the criminality question,247 and despite Perkins’ insistence that he 
made the donation to promote policyholder interests and “had acted 
in the honest belief that he was benefiting the company,” the court 
unanimously agreed that the donation was ultra vires because not 
authorized by its charter.248 A company tactically purposed with 
writing insurance, in other words, could not pursue its strategic 
purpose—assumed to be serving stockholder interests249—by making 
campaign contributions. Had the charter authorized political activity, 
the donation would presumably have been legitimate, as long as it was 
made ultimately to benefit shareholders.250 
Brinson Ry. Co. v. Exchange Bank of Springfield, in holding that a 
railroad corporation’s attempting to build a school in a town on its 
line was ultra vires, succinctly stated the concept of tactical corporate 
purpose by referring to the operations in which a corporation may 
engage: “Every corporation must act according to its nature: a trading 
 
http://www.transunion.com/corporate/about-transunion/who-we-are/company-
history.page (last visited Sept. 8, 2016). It acquired a credit agency to complement some of its 
technology investments. Id. Its railcar-leasing business subsequently declined, and it is now one 
of the three primary credit-reporting firms. TransUnion is the subject of the famous case, Smith 
v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 246. People ex rel. Perkins v. Moss, 80 N.E. 383, 383, 391 (N.Y. 1907); see supra text 
accompanying notes 136–150. 
 247. New York’s high court ruled that criminal charges could not stand because the matter 
was “private in its character and must be redressed by private suit.” Perkins, 80 N.E. at 386. 
 248. Id. at 386–87 (“The company had not the right, under the law of its existence, to 
agree to make contributions for political campaigns, any more than to agree to do other things 
foreign to its charter”); id. at 388 (Hiscock, J., concurring) (stating that the contribution “was 
absolutely beyond the purposes for which that corporation existed”); see id. at 392 (Cullen, C.J., 
dissenting) (describing Perkins’s actions as both ultra vires and criminal). 
 249. See supra text accompanying notes 136–150. 
 250. Cf. SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS § 2819 (2d ed. 1909) (discussing the problems with ultra vires political 
donations); People v. Gansley, 158 N.W. 195, 201 (Mich. 1916) (holding that a firm chartered 
for the “purpose of manufacturing beer” could not make a $500 political contribution because 
“[t]he privilege was not conferred upon it of using its funds for the purpose of influencing public 
sentiment in connection with any election”). 
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corporation must trade, a manufacturing corporation must 
manufacture, a banking corporation must bank, a transportation 
corporation must carry, etc.”251 
Not all courts were so restrictive. Virgil v. Virgil Practice Clavier 
Co. and Steinway v. Steinway & Sons allowed firms chartered to make 
and sell musical instruments to open music schools and donate pianos 
to charity on the ground that they were directly related to the firms’ 
purposes.252 
These typical purposes were all tactical—they prescribed the 
business operations in which the firms could engage while pursuing 
their strategic purposes.253 They were restrictive by nature. The 1967 
“any lawful purpose” language lifted this restriction in firms that opted 
into it. There is no reason to believe that in making it easier to engage 
in any lawful operations, the Delaware legislature intended to arrogate 
shareholder wealth maximization as the general business corporation’s 
default (or mandatory254) strategic purpose.255 
Courts allow managers of firms chartered to conduct “any lawful 
purpose” to pursue any lawful tactical purpose, including the interests 
of nonshareholder constituencies or donating to political candidates, 
 
 251. Brinson Ry. Co. v. Exch. Bank of Springfield, 85 S.E. 634, 634–35 (Ga. 1915). 
 252. Virgil v. Virgil Prac. Clavier Co., 68 N.Y.S. 335, 335–36 (Sup. Ct. 1900) 
(“[M]anufacturing corporation organized . . . for ‘the manufacture and sale of instruments 
designed for practice and instruction in the art of playing the piano and other instruments having 
a similar keyboard, and of any instrument, appliance, or thing which may be used for such 
practice and instruction, whether independently or in connection with musical instruments or 
with instruments designed for practice only.’”); Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 40 N.Y.S. 718, 
718 (Sup. Ct. 1896) (“[T]he company was incorporated . . . for the purpose, as expressed in the 
certificate of incorporation, of manufacturing and selling pianofortes and other musical 
instruments.”). In Steinway, the plaintiff also challenged more obviously appropriate acts, 
including the construction of a factory and employee facilities. Id. at 719. 
 253. Accord Yosifon, supra note 169, at 185 n.12. Tactical purposes were similar to 
corporate powers, and courts often referred to them as such. See, e.g., Gansley, 158 N.W. at 200, 
201 (referring to beer making as a “purpose”); Brinson, 85 S.E. at 634–35; Perkins, 80 N.E. at 
422; Virgil, 68 N.Y.S. at 337; Steinway, 40 N.Y.S. at 720–22; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 
122 (2011) (covering corporate powers). 
 254. See infra Section III.A. 
 255. Specially chartered corporations are not an automatic exception. As Professor Roberta 
Romano notes, “[t]he chartering of corporations to provide public goods in an earlier era does 
not indicate that the objective was not shareholder wealth maximization. The rate of return on 
those investments was not fixed by the state, as it is today for public utilities.” Romano, supra 
note 83, at 1602 n.10. 
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provided that managers advance the shareholders’ strategic purpose.256 
Corporate law, at base, is about curbing incentive problems via 
fiduciary duties. Unfettered board discretion to alter a strategic 
purpose in ways unauthorized by shareholders would be a classic 
such  problem. 
Given that shareholders are properly assumed to retain the wealth-
maximization stick from the corporate bundle,257 and that statutes are 
most fairly read to allow any lawful tactical purpose, shareholder 
wealth maximization is and should be the default strategic purpose in 
general corporations.258 This rule fits best with the business and 
investing community’s expectations. A contrary rule would be unfair 
and disruptive. With this most natural corporate purpose established, 
if a corporate charter clearly specifies that a corporation is to be 
strategically run for a non–shareholder value end, courts should 
enforce it. It is not a given, however, that corporate law allows such 
flexibility, as discussed in the next Part. 
III. FREEDOM OF CORPORATE PURPOSE 
Although the law of corporate purpose has developed in a context 
where shareholder interests have been synonymous with wealth, it is 
easily adapted to nonpecuniary concerns. It is often said that 
individuals will structure their relationships in a way that maximizes 
their wealth.259 It is better, however, to say that individuals order their 
affairs to maximize their well-being.260 As incomes rise,261 it is natural 
that individuals would shift from purely monetary gain to other, 
 
 256. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n 558 U.S. 310 (2010); supra Section 
II.C. But see infra note 269 (discussing federal law). 
 257. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text. 
 258. A firm with charter limits on its tactical purpose would, of course, be limited to 
engaging in its authorized business operations. 
 259. E.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1549, 1551 n.10 (1989). 
 260. F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM: TEXT AND DOCUMENTS 125–27 (Bruce 
Caldwell ed. 2007) (1944); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Nature of Man, 7 
J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 4 (1994). 
 261. Chad Stone et al., A Guide to Statistics on Historical Trends in Income Inequality, CTR. 
ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES, (July 29, 2016), http://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-
and-inequality/a-guide-to-statistics-on-historical-trends-in-income-inequality. 
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nonpecuniary preferences.262 This Part builds on the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm, proposing that shareholders be allowed to 
order their affairs as they wish by selecting strategic and tactical 
purposes of their choosing when they incorporate. 
This Part first examines whether existing corporate law is 
sufficiently enabling to permit diversity in corporate purpose. 
Concluding that it can be without much alteration, the Article offers 
an approach stressing stockholder choice. The Part then engages the 
question of which strategic purposes should be cognizable. It 
concludes by situating a regime allowing nonwealth purposes amidst 
alternative off-the-rack corporate forms and addressing concerns 
related to enforcing shareholder rights. 
A. Is Corporate Law Sufficiently Enabling? 
This section examines the distinct lack of clarity in whether the 
common law of corporate purpose would recognize a chartered 
nonstandard strategic purpose. It proposes that the doubt be resolved 
in favor of allowing such purposes, subject to proper shareholder 
notice. The section concludes with three case studies of firms 
commonly understood to pursue non–shareholder wealth purposes. 
1. Enforceability of nonstandard strategic purposes 
At least one state chartering agency has been unwilling to accept 
charters with nonstandard purposes. One California attorney working 
with B Lab and another client in 2010 inquired with the California 
Secretary of State about the validity under the California Corporations 
Code of charters containing social purposes.263 The Secretary’s office 
replied only that it would interpret California’s “any lawful act” 
provision literally.264 He attempted to file a certificate of incorporation 
containing the following nonwealth, social purpose on behalf of the 
client: 
Section 1. The purpose of the Corporation is to: 
 
 262. The preferences themselves need not change, but wealth has diminishing marginal 
utility. As individuals become richer, they will naturally begin to demand more of what is not 
tied directly to money. 
 263. Telephone Interview with R. Todd Johnson, Partner, Jones Day (Sept. 2, 2016). 
 264. Id.; CAL. CORP. CODE § 202(b) (West 2015). 
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(a) Engage in any lawful act or activity for which a corporation may 
be organized under the General Corporation Law of California other 
than the banking business, the trust company business, or the 
practice of a profession permitted to be incorporated by the 
California Corporations Code; and 
(b) Improve the health of young people by developing and/or 
distributing innovative products and services that will increase 
physical activity in young people.265 
The Secretary rejected several attempts.266 
That same attorney, representing the same client, sought from 
several Delaware law firms an opinion letter stating that a charter 
containing a distinctly nonwealth purpose would be enforceable.267 
None would so opine.268 That is, perhaps, not surprising given how 
strongly Delaware case law implies that a chartered strategic purpose 
other than shareholder wealth maximization would be 
unenforceable.269 In eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, for 
 
 265. E-mail from R. Todd Johnson, Partner, Jones Day, to author (Sept. 9, 2016 9:56 AM 
CDT); [Anonymous], Certificate of Incorporation, June 2010 (on file with author) (The firm’s 
name has been replaced with “Anonymous” to maintain confidentiality.). Although the parties 
involved interpreted subsection (b) of this provision as a strategic purpose, under this Article’s 
proposal, the charter would ideally make it clear that it intends to displace shareholder wealth, 
rather than merely achieve shareholder wealth via operations that improve the health of young 
people by selling innovative products. See infra Section III.A.2. The charter would also have to 
be accompanied by extrinsic notice (which would not likely have been an issue for the proposed 
corporation) to potential share purchasers that shareholder wealth is not the firm’s strategic 
purpose. Id. 
 266. Telephone Interview with R. Todd Johnson, supra note 263; Letter from Theresa 
Rea-Martinez, Staff Counsel, California Secretary of State Business Programs Division Legal 
Review to [Anonymous] (June 14, 2010) (on file with author) (The recipient’s name has been 
replaced with “Anonymous” to maintain confidentiality.). 
 267. Telephone Interview with R. Todd Johnson, supra note 263 
 268. Id. 
 269. As discussed, Delaware is the benchmark for corporate law. See supra note 122. 
Interestingly, federal law after Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), comes 
down fairly clearly, if implicitly, in support of allowing nonstandard charter provisions. See id. at 
2770–71; see also Tyndale House Pubs., Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 116 (D.D.C. 
2012). Professor Bainbridge maintains that Hobby Lobby applies strictly to close corporations. 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Does Hobby Lobby sound a death knell for Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.?, 
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (July 3, 2014), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/
professorbainbridgecom/2014/07/does-hobby-lobby-sound-a-death-knell-for-dodge-v-ford-
motor-co.html. Hobby Lobby’s reasoning, however, applies with equal force to public 
corporations provided that mid-stream investors are aware of a given firm’s unusual purpose. In 
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example, the Delaware Chancery Court addressed, in part, whether it 
was acceptable that Craigslist “not be about the business of 
stockholder wealth maximization.”270 Craigslist’s charter employed 
standard any-lawful-purpose language.271 The court used strong 
language to hold that two of Craigslist’s original stockholders, Jim and 
Craig, who held a majority of the firm’s stock and controlled its board, 
could not eschew shareholder wealth maximization against eBay’s 
objection after eBay purchased 28.4 percent of the company from the 
third original shareholder: 
The corporate form . . . is not an appropriate vehicle for purely 
philanthropic ends, at least not when there are other stockholders 
interested in realizing a return on their investment. Jim and Craig 
opted to form Craigslist, Inc. as a for-profit Delaware corporation and 
voluntarily accepted millions of dollars from eBay as part of a 
transaction whereby eBay became a stockholder. Having chosen a 
for-profit corporate form, the Craigslist directors are bound by the 
fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. Those 
standards include acting to promote the value of the corporation for 
the benefit of its stockholders. The “Inc.” after the company name 
has to mean at least that.272 
Unocal, which the eBay court applied, and other decisions by 
Delaware courts employ nearly as strong language.273 B Lab today 
believes that a charter provision adopting a nonstandard purpose 
would only be enforceable in a jurisdiction governed by a constituency 
statute.274 
 
any event, corporate law is a state animal, making federal precedent merely persuasive in most 
cases. 
 270. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 271. Craigslist, Inc., Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation, Jan. 2, 
2008; see infra text accompanying note 302. 
 272. eBay, 16 A.3d 1 at 34. As this passage suggests, Jim and Craig were involved in the 
transaction in which eBay acquired its interest. Id. at 10. eBay eventually sold its shares back to 
Craigslist after years of litigation. Leena Rao, eBay sells a coveted prize back to Craigslist, ending 
long legal tussle, FORTUNE (June 19, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/06/19/ebay-craigslist
-stake-buy/. 
 273. Id. at 31–35; supra notes 188–189 and accompanying text; see supra Section II.C. 
 274. See Corporation Legal Roadmap, supra note 216. B Lab looked into filing charters 
with nonstandard purposes in California and Delaware in 2010 because those states did not have 
constituency statutes. See supra text accompanying notes 263–268. That experience informs its 
current view. 
2.MOCSARY.FIN2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/16  12:31 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
1372 
Yet most decisional language, although clearly referring to 
shareholder wealth when viewed in context, leaves room for 
nonstandard strategic purposes in referring to the “best interests of the 
corporation’s stockholders” and the “benefit of its shareholder 
owners.”275 And shareholders’ knowing, affirmative, and voluntary 
waiver of the right to wealth maximization would not subject them to 
injustice as would a default plenary-board-power rule.276 The 
American Law Institute agrees, but acknowledges that little law exists 
on the enforceability of nonstandard-strategic-purpose 
charter  provisions.277 
Former Chancellor William B. Chandler III of the Delaware 
Court of Chancery expressed doubt about changing the fundamental 
nature of fiduciary duties, charter provisions to the contrary 
notwithstanding, in a recent lecture.278 Other commenting jurists have 
their doubts, but appear cautiously open to the possibility that 
corporations might validly be chartered to pursue nonstandard ends. 
Vice Chancellor Laster, while stating that wealth maximization is the 
“universal . . . standard of [directorial] conduct,” expressed 
uncertainty about the rule’s mandatory nature: “the principle that 
corporations must be operated for the benefit of the common 
stockholders is likely itself a default rule that the parties to the 
corporate contract can modify.”279 Justice Leo Strine, Jr., appears to 
view non–shareholder wealth strategic purposes as conceivable, even 
noble, but unsustainable.280 
Professor Bainbridge appears to share the jurists’ ambivalence, 
although he seems to have become more receptive to nonwealth 
strategic purposes. In 1992, he wrote that “state law arguably does 
not permit corporate organic documents to redefine the directors’ 
fiduciary duties” because shareholder wealth maximization was well 
 
 275. See supra notes 188–189 and accompanying text (emphasis added). 
 276. See supra text surrounding notes 234–235. 
 277. 1 AM. LAW INST., 1-2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 reporter’s n.6 [hereinafter ALI REPORT]. 
 278. William B. Chandler III, Presentation at the 8th Annual Berle Symposium: Benefit 
Corporations and the Firm Commitment Universe (June 28, 2016), https://law.seattleu.edu/
centers-and-institutes/berle-center/symposium/berle-viii. 
 279. Laster, supra note 168, at 25, 28 n.115 (emphasis added). 
 280. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations 
Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 149–50 & nn.44–45, 154–55 (2012). 
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settled.281 In 2010, referring to ice cream maker Ben & Jerry’s social 
mission, he wrote: “As a contractarian, . . . if Ben & Jerry went public 
with a [corporate social responsibility] provision in their articles, I’d 
have no objection.”282 More recently, in discussing Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby, he referred to shareholder wealth maximization as a mere 
default rule.283 
Other academics seem to take for granted the validity of provisions 
orienting a firm toward non–shareholder wealth ends. Professor 
Jonathan R. Macey views their enforceability as a consequence of the 
contractarian aspect of corporations.284 Professors Easterbrook and 
Fischel agree, with a more normative undercurrent stressing 
constituent freedom.285 
This Article adopts the Macey-Easterbrook-Fischel view as part of 
its theoretical underpinning. It adds its view of the corporation as a 
historical bundle of sticks, of which shareholders retain the right to 
determine corporate ends, and an associational entity through which 
shareholders pursue their goals. But a charter provision opting out of 
shareholder value may not meet the demands of public policy given 
that most shareholders invest for profit in an environment where they 
have little control and believe that managers have a duty to try to 
maximize their wealth.286 Sufficient notice to mid-stream stockholders 
answers this concern. 
2. Notice 
The success of a corporate-law system accommodating strategic 
purposes other than shareholder wealth maximization requires 
 
 281. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 985. 
 282. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Does eBay spell doom for corporate social 
responsibility?, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Dec 6, 2010), http://www.professorbainbridge.
com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/12/does-ebay-spell-doom-for-corproate-social-
responsibility.html. 
 283. Bainbridge, supra note 269. 
 284. Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to 
Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266, 
1268–69 (1999). 
 285. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 9, at 36. 
 286. See Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 117–18 (Del. 1952) (stating 
that shareholders may alter a common-law rule only if they avoid “a result forbidden by settled 
rules of public policy”). 
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predictability by and fairness to shareholders.287 This subsection 
proposes notice requirements that would alleviate prejudice to 
shareholders, and then applies it in three case studies. 
a. Form of notice. In accord with the view of a corporation as a 
placeholder for stockholder rights, corporate law already allows 
shareholders to run their firms for any strategic purpose if they are 
unanimous in their wishes.288 There is no reason that later-stage, 
diffusely held firms cannot inherit and be managed to pursue 
nonstandard ends. Nonstandard purposes should be accepted as 
legitimate provided that mid-stream shareholders are put on notice via 
the firm’s organic documents, other sources, or both, of the 
nonstandard terms of the corporate bargains into which they enter.289 
Given the corporate charter’s fundamental role in setting the 
terms of the corporate contract, inclusion therein of a nonstandard 
strategic purpose should be a necessary condition of validity.290 The 
articles of incorporation would have to clearly distinguish the 
corporation’s strategic and tactical purposes.291 But a charter provision 
is likely to put on notice only those with the know-how and resources 
to obtain corporate charters. Even in the Internet age, obtaining a 
charter copy from most state chartering agencies can be a complex 
matter, often involving the payment of nontrivial fees and waiting for 
 
 287. It is worth considering whether nonshareholder constituencies should also be noticed 
in situations where a corporation’s nonstandard strategic purpose is intertwined with its tactical 
one to the extent that it impacts the firm’s income, and by extension its ability to meet other 
contractual obligations. This potential topic of future work relates to the residual risk-bearing 
issue mentioned in note 189, supra. This Article assumes that nonshareholders are responsible 
for investigating their counterparties’ financial conditions, as in any other contracting situation 
involving corporations. 
 288. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 350 (2011); 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. §§ 5/7.70–7.71 (West 
2015); see also eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010); Clark 
v. Dodge, 199 N.E. 641, 642 (1936) (holding enforceable a unanimous shareholder agreement 
restricting the board’s managerial authority); ALI REPORT, supra note 277, § 2.01 reporter’s 
n.6; Bainbridge, supra note 269. 
 289. This would bind stockholders who dissented from a firm’s nonwealth end, eliminating 
the need for the unanimity otherwise required to pursue a nonwealth purpose. In Craigslist’s 
case, the dissenting shareholder broke unanimity, and won. See supra text accompanying notes 
270, 288; infra note 303 and accompanying text. 
 290. The charter may also specify a mechanism for shareholders to change their 
strategic  purpose. 
 291. It might use this Article’s nomenclature, referring to the “tactical purpose” and 
“strategic purpose,” or other language indicating the operations in which the corporation may 
engage and the ends which those operations are intended to promote. 
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a hard copy of the charter to arrive in the mail.292 Public corporations 
must include their charters in their 10-Q and 10-K filings mandated 
by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Although these filings are 
publicly available, finding them via the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s EDGAR online database is cumbersome. The filings are 
more easily searched using third-party databases,293 but these carry 
high subscription fees. The difficulty and costs involved in obtaining 
charters, although not serious impediments for institutional 
investors,294 would substantially inhibit notice via charter for the 
individual holders of roughly half of U.S. equities.295 
Until, or for a modest period after, it becomes easier for lay 
investors to obtain corporate charters, additional public dissemination 
of a firm’s nonstandard purpose should be required to deem notice 
sufficient.296 Notice may consist of the firm’s public behavior, a 
 
 292. For example, the author’s research involved obtaining charters from a number of 
states, including Connecticut, Delaware, Vermont, and Pennsylvania. Obtaining Newman’s 
Own Inc.’s articles of incorporation from Connecticut involved searching for the entity online, 
sending the state a paper check for $40, and waiting for the documents to arrive in the mail 
about 10 days later. Retrieving Craigslist’s corporate documents from Delaware required 
searching for the entity online, paying a $20 fee by credit card to see more detailed company 
information and a filing history, going to a different web page and paying another $36 for the 
documents, and them waiting for them to arrive in the mail. Getting Ben & Jerry’s articles of 
association from Vermont required searching for the business online, filling out a web form, 
writing out a paragraph of text describing the requested documents, and waiting for the 
documents to arrive via e-mail a few days later. Retrieving Conestoga Woods’ corporate 
documents from Pennsylvania involved searching for the entity online, paying a $15 fee ($3 
each) for the documents, and downloading them immediately. 
293.   E.g., Company Filings, INTELLIGIZE, http://www.intelligize.com/products/compa
ny-filings/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2016). 
 294. See Gordon, supra note 259, at 1562–63 (discussing investor attention to charter 
provisions in a context suggesting that the investors are sophisticated). Institutional investors 
and others who have easy access to charters may be considered to be on inquiry notice. 
 295. MATTEO TONELLO & STEPHAN RABIMOV, THE 2010 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT 
REPORT: TRENDS IN ASSET ALLOCATION AND PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION 22 (2010) (showing 
that institutions owned 50.6 percent of outstanding U.S. equity in 2009); see also ALI REPORT, 
supra note 277, § 2.01 reporter’s n.6 (“[T]he mere fact that [a public corporation] has a 
restriction of this nature in its certificate of incorporation may not be sufficient to make a 
restriction on the profit motive effective if few shareholders are actually aware of the provision.”). 
 296. In states like Vermont or Pennsylvania, where shareholders can readily obtain charter 
copies online at little or no cost, see supra note 292, charter notice may be enough now, or in 
the very near future when knowledge of the existence of general corporations with nonstandard 
strategic purposes becomes widespread enough to put potential share purchasers on inquiry 
notice of the need to examine the charters before making equity investments. One might, 
perhaps, eventually also deem nonchartered public notice sufficient. See George A. Mocsary, 
2.MOCSARY.FIN2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/16  12:31 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
1376 
conspicuously posted mission statement,297 private certifications of a 
firm’s nonstandard strategic purpose like those offered by B Lab,298 or 
perhaps conspicuous posting of its charter on its website.299 
 b. Case studies. It is instructive to apply the suggested notice 
requirements to a few firms commonly understood to pursue 
nonstandard strategic purposes, perhaps alongside a wealth-
generation end. 
 (1) Craigslist. Craigslist, the famous classified site which gives 
away most of its advertisements, was founded in 1995 and initially 
incorporated in California in 1999 as 1010 Cole Street.300 In 2004 it 
merged into Craigslist, Inc., a Delaware corporation.301 Craigslist’s 
initial and two subsequent charters included a generic purpose: “The 
purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity for 
which corporations may be organized under the General Corporation 
Law of Delaware.”302 Under both current law and this Article’s 
proposal, eBay’s desire to run the firm for profit destroyed the 
unanimity required to operate a firm chartered with such a generic 
purpose for ends other than shareholder wealth maximization.303 Had 
 
Shareholder Wealth Maximization: A Response to Cynthia Williams, LIBR. L. & LIBERTY (Feb. 
20, 2014), http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/shareholder-wealth-maximization-a-
response-to-cynthia-williams. 
 297. Cf. About Seventh Generation, SEVENTH GENERATION, 
http://www.seventhgeneration.com/about-seventh-generation (last visited Sept. 8, 2016). 
 298. See supra text accompanying note 216. Professor J. Haskell Murray discusses benefits 
and drawbacks of private branding in Murray, supra note 185, at 44–46. 
 299. Some corporations make their charters available online. It is not a ubiquitous practice: 
of 19 corporations randomly chosen by the author’s research assistants (Apple, Ben & Jerrys, 
Best Buy, BIC, Caterpillar, Clorox, Ford, John Deere, Kroger, Nestle, Nike, McDonald’s, 
Purina, Starbucks, Target, Under Armour, Verizon, Vizio, and Walmart), only nine (Apple, Best 
Buy, Caterpillar, McDonald’s, Nestle, Starbucks, Target, Under Armour, and Verizon) posted 
their charters. 
 300. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 8 (Del. Ch. 2010); CAL. SEC’Y 
OF STATE, Business Search, http://kepler.sos.ca.gov/ (search for “1010 Cole Street”). 
 301. Certificate of Merger of 1010 Cole Street, Inc., a California Corporation, into 
Craigslist, Inc., A Delaware Corporation, Oct. 22. 2004. 
 302. Craigslist, Inc., Certificate of Incorporation, Oct. 13, 2004; Craigslist, Inc., Amended 
and Restated Certificate of Incorporation, Apr. 25, 2005; Craigslist, Inc., Second Amended and 
Restated Certificate of Incorporation, Jan. 2, 2008. 
 303. See supra notes 241–245, 261, 269–272, 288 and accompanying text. One might 
argue that eBay must have known Craigslist’s social mission, and should therefore have been 
held to it. See also Johnson & Millon, supra note 123, at 12; supra note 296. Yet it is equally 
true, as Chancellor Chandler noted, that Jim and Craig, who were well represented, knew or 
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Craigslist’s charter stated, for example, that “The purpose of the 
corporation is to provide free online classified advertisements as a 
service to the public. In doing so, it may engage in any lawful 
operations, including charging for some classified advertisements,” its 
mission would have been secure. 
  (2) Ben & Jerry’s. Ice cream maker Ben & Jerry’s was 
incorporated in 1977 by its two eponymous founders, and began its 
well-known social mission in earnest in 1982.304 The company publicly 
offered stock to Vermont residents in 1984 and went fully public the 
following year, all while expanding its social mission.305 As its social 
works expanded, so did the company’s reputation and sales.306 Its 
“double bottom line” may have helped it succeed; it may also have 
contributed to its decline.307 Takeover offers began in the late 1990s, 
and in 2000 the company’s board accepted Unilever’s bid.308 Reports 
soon spread that the board sold because it had no choice but to 
maximize shareholder wealth.309 
Ben & Jerry’s chartered purpose at the time of its sale was: 
To engage in the production, manufacture, and distribution, at both 
wholesale and retail, of ice cream, ice cream novelties, ices, crepes, 
together with other food and beverages, alcoholic and non alcoholic. 
 
To carry on any other lawful business whatsoever in connection with 
any of the foregoing or which is calculated directly or indirectly to 
 
should have known that eBay would seek to have Craigslist run to maximize shareholder wealth 
and that this would break the unanimity required to do otherwise. See supra notes 272, 288 and 
accompanying text. They nonetheless accepted millions of dollars as part of eBay’s acquisition. 
eBay, 16 A.3d at 6, 11. 
 304. Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and the 
Sale of a Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211, 216–17 (2010). 
 305. Id. at 218–19. 
 306. Id. at 218–24. 
 307. Id. at 224–25, 226–27 (discussing consumers’ views of the company as “a force for 
good”); Joshua Fershee, The Wake of the eBay Decision: Is Ben & Jerry’s 
Next?, BUS. L. PROF BLOG (Dec. 6, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/
2010/12/the-wake-of-the-ebay-decision-is-ben-jerrys-next-.html. 
 308. Page & Katz, supra note 304, at 225–26. 
 309. Id. at 212–13; 228–29. 
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promote the interests of the Corporation, or to in any way enhance 
the value of the Corporation.310 
This statement both affirmed the pursuit of value and contained rather 
standard purpose language. It thus would not have supported a 
nonstandard strategic purpose. This is not to say, of course, that the 
company’s board may not easily have gotten away with declining a 
value-maximizing sale contrary to its fiduciary duties.311 The point is 
that the corporation’s charter explicitly required wealth maximization. 
Interestingly, the charter was amended on August 3, 2000, when 
Unilever’s acquisition was finalized.312 Although the new charter 
included a standard purpose,313 it also adopted a lengthy 
mission  statement: 
We have a progressive, nonpartisan social mission that seeks to meet 
human needs and eliminate injustices in our local, national and 
international communities by integrating these concerns into our 
day-to-day business activities. Our focus is on children and families, 
the environment, and sustainable agriculture on family farms. 
• Capitalism and the wealth it produces does not create 
opportunity for everyone equally. We recognize that the gap 
between the rich and the poor is wider than at anytime since the 
1920s. We strive to create economic opportunities for those who 
have been denied them and to advance new models of economic 
justice that are sustainable and replicable.  
• By definition, manufacturing creates waste. We strive to minimize 
our negative impact on the environment. 
• The growing of food is overly reliant on the use of toxic chemicals 
and other methods that are unsustainable. We support sustainable 
and safe methods of food production that reduce environmental 
 
 310. Ben and Jerry’s Homemade, Inc., Articles of Association, Dec. 16, 1977. This purpose 
did not change through six charter amendments. 
 311. Page & Katz, supra note 304, at 233–42; see supra notes 185–186 and accompanying 
text. The board could easily have pointed to its prosocial activities as having been integral to the 
company’s success, and to assert that, in its judgment, continuing those activities as an 
independent firm was in the shareholders’ best interest. 
 312. Our History, BEN & JERRY’S, http://www.benjerry.com/about-us#4timeline (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2016). 
 313. Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc., Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation, 
Aug. 3, 2000 (“The purpose of the Corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity for 
which corporations may be organized under the Vermont Business Corporation Act.”). 
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degradation, maintain the productivity of the land over time, and 
support the economic viability of family farms and rural 
communities. 
• We seek and support nonviolent ways to achieve peace and justice. 
We believe government resources are more productively used in 
meeting human needs than in building and maintaining weapons 
systems. 
• We strive to show a deep respect for human beings inside and 
outside our company and for the communities in which 
they  live.314 
On the one hand, a mission statement can be seen as inherently 
constituting a strategic purpose, coupled with a standard purpose 
statement best seen as referring only to operations.315 On the other, 
the statement refers to integrating this mission into its business 
operations, suggesting that its mission applies only insofar as it can 
lead to greater wealth creation (as it has for much of the company’s 
life). Given the public nature of Ben & Jerry’s mission, Unilever’s 
commitment to that mission, and the company’s having obtained B 
Lab certification in 2012,316 it is safe to assume that, should Unilever 
decide to sell some of its interest in Ben & Jerry’s, buyers would have 
reason to know of the firm’s nonstandard purpose.317 
 (3) Hobby Lobby. Hobby Lobby started as an arts-and-crafts 
store that eventually incorporated in 1977.318 Its certificate of 
incorporation includes a seventeen-paragraph purpose statement that 
is essentially an “extensive recital[] of all the conceivable types of 
business in which the corporation could engage”319 that also includes 
language authorizing the pursuit of “any . . . lawful business . . . 
calculated directly or indirectly to promote the interest of the 
 
 314. Id. 
 315. See supra Section II.E.2; note 313. 
 316. Ben & Jerry’s, BCORPORATION.NET, http://www.bcorporation.net/community/
ben-and-jerrys (last visited Sept. 8, 2016). 
 317. As long as Unilever wholly owns Ben & Jerry’s, it can run its subsidiary as it pleases, 
including enhancing its reputation in pursuit of wealth. 
 318. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2765 (2014); Hobby Lobby, 
Inc., Certificate of Incorporation, Nov. 28, 1977. 
 319. See Welch, supra note 245, § 102.4; supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
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Corporation or to enhance the value of its property.”320 The charter 
does not include reference to the Green family owners’ well-known 
Christian mission.321 Despite the absence of a chartered nonstandard 
purpose, Hobby Lobby has publicized a statement of 
Christian   purpose: 
In order to effectively serve our owners, employees, and customers 
the Board of Directors is committed to: 
Honoring the Lord in all we do by operating the company in a 
manner consistent with Biblical principles. 
Offering our customers an exceptional selection and value. 
Serving our employees and their families by establishing a work 
environment and company policies that build character, 
strengthen individuals, and nurture families. 
Providing a return on the owners’ investment, sharing the 
Lord’s blessings with our employees, and investing in 
our  community. 
We believe that it is by God’s grace and provision that Hobby 
Lobby has endured. He has been faithful in the past, and we 
trust Him for our future.322 
Hobby Lobby’s owners have been able to run the corporation in 
accord with these non-wealth-maximizing principles because they, 
unanimous in their wishes, executed a shareholder agreement to do 
so.323 Were it not for that unanimity and subsequent agreement (which 
is now binding even if a shareholder changes his or her mind), the 
 
 320. Hobby Lobby, Inc., Certificate, supra note 318, at 4. 
 321. For example, Hobby Lobby stores are closed on Sunday despite a resulting reduction 
in profits. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2766. 
 322. This purpose was posted on Hobby Lobby’s website from at least October 2, 2009, 
through April 14, 2015, which covers the period at issue in Burwell. Statement of 
Purpose, HOBBY LOBBY, http://web.archive.org/web/20150501000000*/http://hobbylob
by.com/our_company/purpose.cfm (click on the years and dates within the years in which the 
site indicates that a snapshot was taken). The current version contains the same text, reordered, 
and is no longer called a purpose. Our Story, HOBBY LOBBY, http://www.hobbylobby.com/
about-us/our-story (last visited Sept. 8, 2016). 
 323. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2766; see supra note 288 and accompanying text. 
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Greens would not, for at least the medium term,324 be able to run 
Hobby Lobby to pursue nonwealth ends in the face of a dissenting 
stockholder. 
B. Valid Strategic Purposes 
It remains to determine which strategic purposes the law should 
recognize. A starting point is any strategic purpose that has potential 
to create net positive externalities.325 A starting assumption, in turn, is 
that any otherwise legal act may constitute a cognizable strategic 
purpose. But corporations “exist[] by grace of the law that called 
[them] into being.”326 Legislatures certainly, and courts via the 
common law, could limit the strategic (and tactical) purposes for 
which corporations are formed. 
Potential strategic purposes may be grouped into four categories: 
• the pursuit of shareholder wealth, via any operations; 
• the pursuit of another corporate or outside constituency’s 
wealth or nonwealth interests, via any operations; 
• the pursuit of a public benefit, where the strategic and tactical 
purposes coincide; 
• the pursuit of a nonwealth private benefit for a firm 
constituency, where the strategic and tactical 
purposes  coincide. 
A combination of these is also possible.327 Each creates first-order 
private benefits, public benefits, or both; all create significant second-
 
 324. See supra note 296 and accompanying text. Once the structure proposed herein 
becomes well accepted, a nonchartered purpose declaration may be deemed enough in some 
circumstances. Id. 
 325. What constitutes a positive externality may be difficult to define. As J. William Callison 
says, “One man’s global warming is another’s agricultural crop enhancement—who is to say 
where ‘public benefit’ definitively lies?” Callison, supra note 100, at 104. As discussed supra 
Section I.B.2.b, states have many social-benefit-creating reasons for chartering corporations. 
These benefits are a necessary part of the externality calculus. 
 326. Peer Zumbansen, The New Embeddedness of the Corporation: Corporate Social 
Responsibility in the Knowledge Society, in THE EMBEDDED FIRM: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 
LABOR, AND FINANCE CAPITALISM 119, 140 (Cynthia A. Williams & Peer Zumbansen 
eds.,  2011). 
 327. For a discussion of the multiple-masters problem potentially created by chartering a 
firm to pursue multiple strategic purposes, see infra Section III.C.1. 
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order public benefits.328 They are all, in essence, types of moralities.329 
To limit the exercise of either—pecuniary or otherwise—via the 
corporate form is effectively to disadvantage it in the marketplaces of 
commerce and ideas.330 Given that with proper notice, “the promoters 
of the firm bear all the agency costs associated with the firm’s 
governance arrangements,”331 all should be acceptable corporate ends. 
This section considers some nuances of each type of strategic purpose. 
1. Long-term shareholder wealth maximization 
[F]or most of the twentieth century, public companies drove the 
U.S. economy, producing innovative products for consumers, 
attractive employment opportunities for workers, tax revenues for 
governments, and impressive investment returns for shareholders 
and other investors. Corporations were the beating heart of a 
thriving economic system that served both shareholders 
and  America.332  
And it all happened under the centuries-old societal understanding 
that shareholder wealth maximization was the corporate norm.333 
“That rule has helped produce an economy that is dominated by 
public corporations, which in turn has produced the highest standard 
of living of any society in the history of the world.”334 
But what sort of shareholder wealth maximization? Maximizing 
long-term value, within the bounds of the law is per se proper.335 
Successful long-term planning to improve and develop the firm’s 
products and services will translate into sustainably increased future 
cash flows.336 It is axiomatic that, say, a car company that invests in 
 
 328. Determining what constitutes a benefit may be a difficult task. See supra note 325. 
This Article attempts partly to address this question by distinguishing between first- and second-
order benefits. A first-order benefit is connected to a firm’s tactical and strategic purposes, like 
providing free classified ads. A second-order benefit results collaterally from firm operations, like 
the generation of tax revenues. See supra Section I.B.2.b. 
 329. Or lack thereof, some might say. 
 330. By way of example, both churches and abortion clinics incorporate. 
 331. Gordon, supra note 259, at 1556; see supra Section III.A.2. 
 332. STOUT, supra note 1, at 10; accord id. at 103–04; supra Section I.B.2.b. 
 333. See supra text accompanying notes 2–10; Sections II.A.1, II.C; Bainbridge, SWM 
Norm, supra note 1, at 1423–24 & nn.2 & 3. 
 334. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 1446. 
 335. See supra Section II.C.1. 
 336. No business venture is, of course, ever sure to be successful. 
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research and development to build ever-better cars will benefit all its 
constituents in the long term: Customers happier with their cars will 
buy them in the future and tell their friends to do the same. Robust 
sales require more production, securing employees’ jobs and raises, 
wealthier suppliers, more secure creditors, and communities with 
greater employment opportunities and tax bases. The long-run benefit 
to the shareholder residual claimants is clear: A company with greater 
and more stable cash flows pays greater and more reliable dividends.337 
In markets functioning somewhat properly, some future cash flow will 
be capitalized into current share price.338 
The firm’s success results in general good—as President John F. 
Kennedy famously said, “A rising tide lifts all boats.”339 Indeed, the 
stockholder wealth created by public companies—with respect to 
which the concerns relating to wealth-maximizing behavior are most 
keen340—is being shared by blue- and white-collar employees of nearly 
every income level. Pension funds have demonstrated their ability and 
willingness to share in corporate profits and influence firm behavior 
through their massive stock holdings,341 and “39% of companies make 
 
 337. Contrary to conventional discourse, shareholder value need not manifest itself in share 
price. Dividends are a perfectly acceptable way to enhance shareholder wealth, and may reduce 
the potential for managerial short-termism and other abuse by limiting managers’ access to 
capital. See supra note 130; Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, 
and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986). 
 338. See supra notes 113, 201. 
 339. President Kennedy’s entire statement parallels the idea that one firm’s success has 
significant positive externalities: “A rising tide lifts all the boats and as Arkansas becomes more 
prosperous so does the United States and as this section declines so does the United States. So 
I regard this as an investment by the people of the United States in the United States.” President 
John F. Kennedy, Remarks in Heber Springs, Arkansas, at the Dedication of Greers Ferry Dam 
(Oct. 13, 1963) (transcript available at THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9455 (last visited Sept. 8, 2016)); see also 
Sharfman, supra note 14, at 393 & n.18. But see Bainbridge, SWM Norm, supra note 1, at 1439 
n.57 (noting that where shareholders prefer increased risk, other constituencies may not benefit 
from shareholder centricity). This is likely priced into contracts with the firm where, for example, 
employment is typically at will. 
 340. It is in public corporations that ownership is most separated from control, 
exacerbating the agency-cost problem. See supra Section I.B.1.e. 
 341. See, e.g., Simon Archer, Pension Funds as Owners and as Financial Intermediaries: A 
Review of Recent Canadian Experience, in THE EMBEDDED FIRM: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 
LABOR, AND FINANCE CAPITALISM, supra note 326, at 177, 177–204; Sanford M. Jacoby, Labor 
and finance in the United States, in THE EMBEDDED FIRM: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, LABOR, 
AND FINANCE CAPITALISM 277, 304–09; see also Sanford M. Jacoby, Employee Representation 
and Corporate Governance: A Missing Link, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 449, 452 (2001); Jeffrey 
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their non-exempt employees eligible to receive some kind of stock 
option or stock appreciation right.”342 Further, roughly half of U.S. 
equities are held by individual investors, and fifty-five percent of 
people self-report owning stocks individually, via mutual fund, or in a 
self-directed retirement account.343 Public companies are, by 
definition, open for investment by all.344 The constituencies most often 
cited as needing protection from the shareholder wealth maximization 
norm are well positioned to benefit from long-term value creation. 
There is no need to “break the power of the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm.”345 As Professor Stout says, “To build enduring 
value, managers must focus on the long term as well as tomorrow’s 
stock quotes, and must sometimes make credible if informal 
commitments to customers, suppliers, employees, and other 
stakeholders whose specific investments contribute to the firm’s 
success.”346 Of course. This is the shareholder wealth maximization 
that is the law.347 And because wealth maximization is the most 
versatile stick in the corporate bundle,348 others may benefit as well: 
Cash in hand allows shareholders to donate directly to the causes of 
their choosing, without self-interested management intermediaries 
deciding which of their favored causes to support.349 
 
H. Birnbaum, Lobby’s Co-CEO Quit After Probe; Green Issued Loans Without Authorization, 
WASH. POST, May 17, 2007, at D1 (reporting that labor is the biggest donor to candidates for 
federal offices). Labor, indeed, needs wealth maximization to support its defined contribution 
plans. Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, 43 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 909, 911–12 (2013). Pensioner value is a pension fund’s raison d’etre—its strategic 
purpose. 
 342. Corey Rosen, Equity Compensation: Who Gets What?, NAT’L CTR. FOR EMP. OWNERSHIP 
(Apr. 2012), https://www.nceo.org/articles/equity-compensation-who-gets- what. 
 343. Justin McCarthy, Little Change in Percentage of Americans Who Own Stocks, GALLUP 
(Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/182816/little-change-percentage-americans-
invested-market.aspx. 
 344. Cf. VERA C. SMITH, THE RATIONALE OF CENTRAL BANKING AND THE FREE 
BANKING ALTERNATIVE 89 (1936) (“[B]efore the advent of the joint stock company [banking] 
firms had always consisted of a large number of known and wealthy men.”). 
 345. Murray, supra note 185, at 26. 
 346. STOUT, supra note 1, at 110–11 (emphasis added). 
 347. See supra Sections II.B–C; supra text accompanying and following note 226; see also 
supra text accompanying notes 37–38, 90. 
 348. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 349. It is well known that large corporations are more likely to donate to operas and 
museums than soup kitchens and local schools. 
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The norm is nevertheless often equated with maximizing short-
term stock price.350 This is understandable in a world (1) dominated 
by short-term incentive compensation based on share price,351 (2) 
empowered managers who are most familiar with the firms under their 
charge and thus best positioned to extract wealth from them,352 (3) of 
whom “80 percent . . . report [that] they would sacrifice future 
economic value to manage short-term earnings so as to meet investor 
expectations,”353 and (4) a business judgment rule that provides 
managers cover for all but their most obviously self-serving actions.354 
The same holds for politically and legally empowered shareholders 
willing to use their power, via loyal managers, to their short-term 
benefit.355 
Aside from the incentive for fraud, theft, and manipulation that 
short-termism creates,356 it can easily skew incentives toward otherwise 
legitimate-appearing, but value-destroying, activities. It should not be 
a surprise, for example, that managers compensated on short-term 
results would prefer putting the firm’s cash into a bank account or far 
riskier positions if doing so would yield greater short-term returns 
than research and development, which by its nature is a long-term 
investment. 
Scholarship disagreeing about whether and over which time 
horizons corporations pursue shareholder wealth abounds.357 It is 
 
 350. E.g., STOUT, supra note 1, passim; Williams, supra note 155. 
 351. STOUT, supra note 1, at 20, 53, 71, 104–06 (discussing also legal provisions, 
including those in the tax code, that incent short-term compensation packages); Mocsary, supra 
note 113, at 131. 
 352. Winkler, supra note 64, at 911 (noting managers’ “secrecy, skill and evasive . . . 
methods); COOK, supra note 101, § 643; see supra text accompanying and following note 3. 
These sources show that this problem is not new. 
 353. Keith L. Johnson & Frank Jan De Graaf, Modernizing Pension Fund Legal Standards 
for the Twenty-First Century, in WILLIAMS & ZUMBANSEN, supra note 326, at 459, 464. 
 354. See supra notes 184–186 and accompanying text; see also supra Section II.B. 
 355. See STOUT, supra note 1, at 52, 112 (discussing proxy-access and other federal 
regulations making it easier for large shareholders to influence management); Mocsary, supra 
note 113, at 126 (discussing loose distribution rules), 131. Pension funds often fall into this 
category. See supra note 341 and accompanying text. 
 356. These were perpetrated by Enron management in enormous scale and scope against 
just about every imaginable internal and external constituency. See generally, BETHANY MCLEAN 
& PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS 
FALL OF ENRON (reprint ed. 2013). 
 357. Compare, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential Unity of Shareholders and the Myth 
of Investor Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97 (2010), and Bernard S. Sharfman, A Theory 
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clear, however, that cover for, and incentives to engage in, long-term-
value-destroying activities are present.358 The pursuit of short-run 
wealth is nevertheless appropriate in the special situations where the 
long- and short-term are one, like at the Revlon moment,359 or for 
“companies formed to achieve some specific, short-run objective,”360 
like the development of a leased oil field, where the value of the lease 
declines markedly over its term.361 The short-term nature of such 
corporations’ purpose should be especially well noticed. 
Notwithstanding money’s versatility,362 some shareholders may 
desire to sacrifice financial returns to achieve other objectives. 
2. Pursuing nonshareholder constituency interests 
A firm might be chartered to pursue the interests of a beneficiary 
other than its shareholders. The beneficiary may be one with 
substantial connections with the firm, like the firm’s employees, 
customers, or community. It may be one not part of the corporate 
team,363 like a specified cause or charity.364 
The benefit may be pecuniary, in which case the firm’s free cash 
flow not needed to sustain the company in the long term would be 
paid to the employees as salary, customers as rebates, or its locality or 
a charity as a donation or a sort-of dividend. It may involve 
 
of Shareholder Activism and its Place in Corporate Law, 82 TENN. L. REV. 791 (2014–2015), 
with Simon Deakin, Corporate governance and financial crisis in the long run, in WILLIAMS & 
ZUMBANSEN, supra note 326, at 15, and Jarrad Harford et al., Do Long-Term Investors 
Improve Corporate Decision Making? (July 2, 2016) (Finance Down Under 2015 and Asian 
Finance Association 2015 conference paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2505261. 
 358. It may be that some measure of managerial short-termism is part of a closer-to-
optimal equilibrium than could be realized under a legal rule other than the BJR. See supra notes 
185–186 and accompanying text. 
 359. See supra text accompanying notes 199–203. 
 360. Robert N. Anthony, The Trouble with Profit Maximization, 38 HARV. BUS. REV. 126, 
127 (1960). 
 361. The lessor would presumably price into the lease the value of this short-term use, and 
positive law (hopefully) exists to prevent pollution and the like. Oil workers’ pay should likewise 
price the term of employment. 
 362. See supra note 82 and accompanying and following text. 
 363. See supra text accompanying note 34. 
 364. More complex analogs that serve these interests exist: corporations can be employee-
owned and employees can benefit from profit-sharing arrangements; mutual companies are 
owned by their customers; municipal corporations engage in profit-making activities; and 
nonprofits serve many causes. These suggest that true freedom of corporate purpose is feasible. 
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guaranteeing job security to the extent possible, providing free 
product to customers, building up a community’s infrastructure, or 
directly serving a charity’s beneficiaries. 
While the firm is profitable, it makes the specified constituency 
look more like the corporation’s residual claimant while the 
stockholders join those whose rights—if they retain any—are fixed by 
contract. The founders presumably formed the corporation from a 
desire to serve its chartered end, and may retain the rights to vote for 
directors and to sue them derivatively. They may, however, decide to 
grant this right to the beneficiary or a third party. When the firm is 
losing money, however, the stockholders may need to infuse more 
equity into the firm to keep it going. 
3. Pursuing a publicly beneficial tactical purpose 
Corporate founders may form a firm strategically purposed to 
engage in certain tactical purposes365 that provide first-order benefits 
to the public. The purpose may be humanitarian, like operating a 
health-care facility; environmental, like providing free pollution 
cleanup; religious, providing a place of worship to all comers; or 
focused on providing a specific service, like giving away classified ads, 
as does Craigslist,366 or providing train service, as does Amtrak. 
Amtrak, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, was 
incorporated by Congress under the District of Columbia Business 
Corporation Act.367 It is subject to that Act unless federal law provides 
otherwise.368 It was formed—its strategic purpose is—to serve “public 
convenience and necessity” by providing rail service and meeting 
other national transportation goals.369 Although it must “be operated 
and managed as a for-profit corporation,”370 it has received perpetual 
 
 365. Some business people may think of this as a “stractical purpose.” See, e.g., Jack S. 
Duggal, Next Level Up: Are You a “Stractical” Project Manager?, PROJECT MGMT. INST. (Dec. 
2009), https://pmi-ctt.org/index.php/resources/newsletter/2007-2009/doc_download/
15-issue-44-december-2009. This Article declines to adopt this amorphous term. 
 366. See supra Section III.A.2.b.i. 
 367. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 385 (1995). 
 368. Its charter is thus effectively the document filed with the District, as superseded 
by statute. 
 369. 49 U.S.C. §§ 24101, 24307 (2012 & Supp. 2015); Lebron, 513 U.S. at 383–84. 
 370. 49 U.S.C. § 24301(a)(2) (2012). 
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subsidies.371 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that, despite contrary 
Congressional intent, Amtrak is not a private corporation because it is 
government controlled,372 but there is no reason that private 
stockholders could not create such an entity.373 
A continuing entity, whether a general business corporation or 
nonprofit, needs capital to continue operating. The capital may come 
from profitable operations, as in Craigslist’s case, or from cash 
infusions by the owners, as in Amtrak’s case. Both are acceptable in 
the case of properly informed private stockholders.374 
4. Pursuing a privately beneficial tactical purpose 
A final question is whether corporate founders should be allowed 
to form a corporation to pursue a private benefit where the strategic 
purpose is to engage in a tactical purpose that provides first-order 
benefits to stockholders or another constituency. In fact, analogs of 
this form already exist. Housing cooperatives throughout the U.S. are 
home to 1.2 million families.375 The first-order benefits are entirely 
stockholder-serving: to provide them with a place to live while 
maximizing their comfort to the extent that the cooperative’s finances 
allow. Other examples include incorporated family farms,376 and 
MasterCard, which until 2003 was a nonprofit membership 
corporation purposed to process its 25,000 member institutions’ 
 
 371. Dep’t. of Transp. v. Assoc. of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1232 (2015); Lebron, 513 
U.S. at 380 n.1, 385. “In its first 43 years of operation, Amtrak has received more than $41 
billion in federal subsidies. In recent years these subsidies have exceeded $1 billion annually.” 
Assoc. of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. at 1232. 
 372. Id. at 1232–33. 
 373. Presumably on a smaller scale. See supra note 371. 
 374. The charter may include a provision allowing the board of directors to levy an 
assessment on shareholders. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(6) (Supp. 2015). Enforcing an 
assessment would be prohibitively difficult in the case of a public corporation with diffuse 
ownership, but possible in theory. A very high stock price, for example, is likely to concentrate 
ownership in the hands of those who can afford an assessment. Cf. Berkshire Hathaway Shares 
Top $200,000, Buffett Worth Nearly $66B, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2014, 1:22 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2014/08/14/berkshire-shares-top-200000-
buffett-worth-nearly-66b/. 
 375. NAT’L CONSUMER COOP. BANK, A CONSUMER’S GUIDE TO BUYING A CO-OP 
2  (2007). 
 376. See supra text accompanying notes 48–50. Some, like Ben & Jerry’s, consider the 
support of family farming to be a public service. See supra text accompanying note 314. 
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credit-card transactions.377 Second-order positive externalities 
generated by such firms can be substantial and are like those under the 
shareholder value norm.378 
C. Accountability 
Corporate law is about setting default rules that facilitate efficient 
transacting and restraining the potential for opportunistic behavior, 
such as shirking or rent seeking, by the board of directors. General 
corporations with fully customizable tactical and strategic purposes 
allow shareholders to create organizational architectures that best 
balance managerial decision rights, their performance evaluation, and 
their reward system.379 Corporate founders possess knowledge of their 
firms’ “particular circumstances of time and place” that makes them 
the best judges of both how to create monetary or nonmonetary 
benefits and how to align managerial incentives and protect 
shareholders.380 
This section discusses two broad implications of this Article’s 
proposal on organizational architecture. It first discusses how the 
flexibility to customize corporate purpose alleviates the multiple-
masters problem vis-à-vis benefit corporations (b-corps), the most 
common corporate variant accommodating nonwealth ends, by 
allowing shareholders to specify a finite set of measurable purposes.381 
It then briefly addresses potential concerns with enforcing fiduciary 
duties in the context of nonstandard purposes. 
 
 377. EDWARD P. STRINGHAM, ANARCHY AND THE LAW: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
CHOICE 304 (2011); Robert E. Litan & Alex J. Pollock, The Future of Charge Card Networks 6 
(AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Reg. Studies, Working Paper 06-03, 2006). 
 378. See supra Sections I.B.2.b, III.B.1. 
 379. This Article thus adopts the conceptual framework of University of Rochester Simon 
Business School professors James A. Brickley, Clifford W. Smith, and Jerrold L. Zimmermen. 
See JAMES A. BRICKLEY ET AL., MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
ARCHITECTURE viii–ix, 280–450 (3d ed. 2004). Their framework builds on Jensen & Meckling, 
supra note 5, and other work. 
 380. Todd J. Zywicki & Anthony B. Sanders, Posner, Hayek and the Economic Analysis of 
Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 559, 561–62, 568 (2008). 
 381. California’s Social Purpose Corporations Act comes closest to the system advocated 
herein. It allows the formation of “social purpose corporation[s]” that must pursue shareholder 
profit and either (1) promote one or more public benefit or (2) commit to minimizing its effect 
on an intra- or extra-firm constituency. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b). The Act does not allow 
the pursuit of a single purpose. 
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1. Off-the-rack alternatives 
The multiple-masters problem is summed up by Professors 
Easterbrook and Fischel: “[A] manager told to serve two masters (a 
little for the equity holders, a little for the community) has been freed 
of both and is answerable to neither. Faced with a demand from either 
group, the manager can appeal to the interests of the other.”382 It is 
said that “[C]orporate decision making is more efficient and effective 
when management has a single, clearly-defined objective, and 
shareholder wealth maximization provides not only a workable 
decision guide but one that, if pursued, increases the total wealth 
creation of the firm.”383 Managers, however, are perfectly capable of 
multitasking.384 But balancing provides them cover to “serve” the 
constituency with interests most aligned with their own; managers 
have shown their willingness to “balance” in this way.385 
B-corps must serve multiple constituencies. Those formed under 
the Model Benefit Corporation Act “shall have a purpose of creating 
general public benefit” and “may [pursue] one or more specific public 
benefits.”386 The general public benefit is exceedingly broad, covering 
“all of the effects of the business on society and the environment,” 
and is “assessed against a third-party standard.”387 Pursuing general 
benefits is mandatory even if the charter specifies a specific public 
 
 382. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 9, at 38. Scholarship on the multiple-masters 
topic is legion. See, e.g., Strine, supra note 280, at 150; Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2001); 
Bainbridge, SWM Norm, supra note 1 passim. 
 383. John R. Boatright, What’s Wrong—and What’s Right—with Stakeholder Management, 
22 J. PRIVATE ENTER. 106, 119 (2006) (citation omitted). 
 384. See STOUT, supra note 1, at 108. 
 385. See, e.g., Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986) 
(observing that the “principal benefit” of the Revlon board’s ostensibly serving Revlon’s 
noteholders “went to the directors”); Bainbridge, SWM Norm, supra note 1, at 1445–46 
(“Many of the same managers who vigorously lobbied state legislators in favor of nonshareholder 
constituency statutes, were equally vigorous in opposing plant closing laws and other worker 
protection statutes. Many of the same managers who bewailed the jobs lost after successful 
corporate takeovers, were silent about the jobs lost because of management defensive tactics. 
Ironically, much of the anecdotal evidence on the harm to nonshareholders caused by takeovers 
relates to employees fired after defensive restructurings used by incumbent managers to defeat a 
hostile bid.”); supra notes 351–355 and accompanying text. 
 386. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 201(a)–(b). 
 387. Id. § 102 & cmt. 
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benefit.388 Directors are explicitly required to consider the interests of 
shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers, its and its suppliers’ 
communities, and the local and global environments; they may 
consider “the interests of any other group that they deem 
appropriate.”389 Delaware allows its b-corps to pursue specifically 
enumerated public benefits only and makes assessment against a third-
party standard optional, but it nonetheless mandates consideration of 
“the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s 
conduct.”390 
If enforcing managerial fidelity under the permissive BJR is 
difficult, it is impossible when an act otherwise egregious enough to 
warrant judicial scrutiny can be explained away by pointing to another 
constituency, especially when managers are required to consider 
constituencies with interests directly adverse to those of the firm.391 
Such vastly expanded managerial cover may warrant more managerial 
accountability than demanded by the BJR. Mandating adjudication of 
the general benefit against a third-party standard may also transfer 
significant de facto control over corporate affairs from managers to 
third-parties. It displaces managers’ and founders’ specific knowledge 
and “conceptions of the ‘good,’” with that of distant strangers.392 
Ironically, the b-corp model may, by upsetting the delicate balance of 
managerial authority and accountability, undermine both the striking 
growth that the BJR enables and the corporation’s role as a laboratory 
for socially beneficial endeavors.393 
The proposal herein would allow founders free reign to set 
strategic purpose. Their choice would be free of third-party 
interference and undiluted by a plethora of general public benefits that 
their firms may be ill equipped to achieve. They could choose ends, 
including private nonpecuniary benefits, against which firm 
 
 388. Id. §§ 201(c), 301 cmt.; see Callison, supra note 100, at 98. 
 389. Id. § 301(a)(1)–(2) (emphasis added). 
 390. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 362(a), 365(a), 366(c)(3) (Supp. 2014, 2015). 
 391. See supra notes 185, 389 and accompanying text; see also supra Section II.B.1. 
 392. Callison, supra note 100, at 98–104. The third parties may also be captured by 
“fourth-party” interests or by a subset of the certified firms. 
 393. See supra text accompanying notes 110, 151–153. 
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performance is readily measurable while avoiding those that 
enable  cheating.394 
2. Enforcing shareholder rights 
The chief danger of freedom of corporate purpose is that a 
shareholder vote in a wealth-maximizing firm will adopt a 
nonstandard purpose, leaving dissenting shareholders with 
significantly devalued post-vote shares. In corporations chartered 
prior to the general acceptance of nonwealth strategic purposes, the 
acceptance of such purposes should therefore be accompanied by very 
strong appraisal rights or a near-unanimity requirement—a 
shareholder vote of at least ninety or ninety-five percent—to adopt 
nonstandard strategic purposes.395 A lower threshold, like the two-
thirds accompanied by appraisal rights for dissenters required by 
Delaware to convert a general corporation into a b-corp, should 
suffice for firms formed after nonstandard purposes become 
accepted.396 At that point, founders would be aware of the need to 
specify a higher threshold in the charter should they desire one. Lower 
thresholds would enable stockholders with potential non–shareholder 
 
 394. Founders could, of course, purpose a firm with immeasurable ends. They are free to 
take that risk, and future shareholders are free to buy into it. For more on b-corps’ inefficiencies, 
see Murray, supra note 185; Callison, supra note 100. 
A word on nonprofit corporations is also in order: As for-profit firms currently serve their 
owners’ pecuniary interests, nonprofits serve nonpecuniary ones. Not allowing a customizable 
middle ground is arbitrarily limiting. At a workshop of this paper, a participant who worked with 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) noted that since 2008 many NGOs have been 
struggling financially and unable to make up their shortfalls by engaging in profit-making 
activities. She noted that the availability of the framework proposed herein might have alleviated 
this problem. 
 395. Appraisal rights are notoriously inadequate for compensating dissenting shareholders 
who exercise them in various contexts. See, e.g., Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 
466 (1977) (shares appraised at $150 going concern value in a Delaware short-form merger 
while the firm’s assets were worth $640 per share). 
Delaware initially required 90-percent shareholder approval for a traditional corporation 
to convert to a benefit corporation, but modified its statute to require only a two-thirds vote, 
apparently finding that 90-percent was too high when publicly traded Etsy had trouble 
converting. Haskell Murray, Amendments to Delaware PBC Law (“The Etsy 
Amendments”), BUS L. PROF BLOG (July 3, 2015), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
business_law/2015/07/amendments-to-delaware-pbc-law-the-etsy-amendments.html. 
Delaware’s change illustrates the need for a high threshold—the losing one third 
deserves protection. 
 396. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 363(a) (Supp. 2015). 
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wealth ends, like pension funds or foundations, too easily to hijack a 
successful wealth-creating  company. 
The instant proposal should otherwise have relatively little impact 
on existing legal rules or their implementation. Ultimate decision-
making authority would continue to default to a BJR-protected 
board.397 There seems little reason to abandon such a successful 
governance arrangement, especially considering that firms with 
nonwealth ends are more likely to be run by their founders or others 
with a passion for the purpose. 
Courts are experienced in applying legal concepts from one area 
to another. Although it is by design rare for courts to second-guess 
managers,398 applying the BJR to ends other than shareholder wealth 
maximization should be noncontroversial. Asking, for example, 
whether a merger serves a firm’s community rather than its 
shareholders is well within judges’ capabilities. Indeed, they do 
essentially this when determining whether managers of nonprofits 
have adhered to their duty of obedience to their organizations’ 
missions.399 The primary danger is that some difficult-to-quantify 
nonstandard purposes may obscure managers’ self-serving actions. 
But knowing and willing shareholders should be allowed to risk their 
capital in this way.400 Shareholders will, of course, do well to plan ex 
ante to maximize managerial fidelity, and to retain control of or avoid 
undertakings where this is overly difficult. 
CONCLUSION 
The general business corporation is a multi-faceted, multi-purpose 
entity. Its full potential can be realized by freeing it from its one-size-
fits-all wealth-maximization application. Long-term shareholder 
wealth maximization provides a great deal of social benefit; it is the 
proper default corporate strategic purpose. Nonwealth strategic 
purposes have similar potential. 
Some owners may desire wealth, and purpose their corporations 
with long-run financial gain. Others may believe that the best path to 
 
 397. See id. § 141(a). 
 398. See supra Section II.B.1–2. Professor Haskell Murray terms the application of 
fiduciary-duty rules to nonstandard purposes the “purpose judgment rule.” Murray, supra note 
185, at 41–42. 
 399. NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI & JACLYN F. CHERRY, UNDERSTANDING NONPROFIT AND 
TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 3.03[C] (2d ed. 2012). 
 400. See supra note 394 and accompanying text; Murray, supra note 185, at 41–42. 
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wealth is indirect, via service to others. Still others may have little 
interest in making money and seek to enable some other mission with 
the corporate form. The law should not impose either end upon a 
stockholder who desires another. Informed shareholders should be 
allowed to pursue all lawful strategic purposes with their firms. 
It remains to be seen how many firms will be chartered with 
nonstandard ends. The existence of firms like Craigslist, Ben & Jerry’s, 
and Hobby Lobby, where stockholder unanimity enables the pursuit 
of nonwealth ends, suggests that the number will be nontrivial. Non-
wealth-seeking entrepreneurs would no longer have to choose 
between a general corporation that must pursue wealth and a b-corp 
with severely diluted managerial accountability. That is a choice 
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